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Chapter i
INTRODUC’ITON
John Fitz Gerald and Justin Johnston
The importance of energy utilities, both electricity and gas, in a modern
economy is often underestimated. It is only when a problem occurs that public
attention is, perforce, focused on their operations. However, their central economic
role merits more constant and focused interest from policy makers.
Throughout Europe there is a new interest in the operation of ener~, utilities
and close attention is being paid to how they are structured, to the role of
competition in ensuring efficient operation, to security of supply, and to the
environmental consequences of the way they are operated. The Commission of the
European Communities has made some of the running in recent years. However, as
in so many other areas, the need to re-examine policy in Ireland stems primarily
from our own requirements rather th~n from any external imperative.
The Ener~, Policy Research Centre in The Economic and Social Research
Institute has now been in operation for over four years. One of the major projects
which it has undertaken over that period has been an examination of the issues to
be considered in planning the structure of Irish energy utilities for the next
century. The results of this research are published as Chapter 2 in this Policy
Paper by John Fitz Gerald and Justin Johnston. This contribution considers the
special features of the electricity and gas systems in Ireland which must be taken
into account in any restructuring programme. The small size .of the island.economy
and the importance of scale economies makes it difficult to introduce competition
in the indust~,. In the light of experlence elsewher% and developments in the
industry in Ireland over the last decade, the paper recommends that competition
can best be’introduced by contractin8 out many aspects of the business to private
companies. Selling off the utilities as they stand would do nothing to improve
competition and would, as a result, not enhance the overall competitiveness of the
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economy. The authors also recomnaend the development of an independent
regulatory authority covering all energy utilities, and possibly also other utilities,
such as telecommunications.
Chapter 3 by Michael McGurnaghan discusses the Northern Ireland
experience of electricity privatisation. This experience is of vital importance in
considering future developments in the Republic. The isolated nature of the two
systems on this island poses similar problems for policy makers on both sides of
the border. The potential benefits front linking the two systems in the future
provides a further impetus for considering the Northern Ireland experience and the
problems that have to be faced in promoting an efficient industry in the two parts
of the island.
Chapter 4 by Richard Green shows how the electricity system in Britain has
been restructured. The nature of the original privatisation has necessitated a
comprehensive approach by the independent regulatou, authority to ensure that the
benefits of competition are passed through to consumers.
Chapter 5 by Ole Jess Olsen, describes the Nordic experience of introducing
competition in electricity. This experience varies considerably from count~, to
country within Scandinavia. Norway has gone further down the road of
competition than any other European country and is, as a result, of special
interest. However, its reliance on hydro power means that this experience is not
fully transferable to other countries. Denmark, by contrast~ has maintained its
integrated electricity system which relies heavily on interconnection with its Nordic
partners, Norway and Sweden, to produce some of the lowest electricity prices
within the EU.
These papers were originally presented at a conference on Energy Utilities
and Competitiveness in the ESRI on 13th February, 1995. While they all focus on
how competitive pressures can best be intrnduced into the energy utility indust~,,
they also highlight the diversity of European experience in this area. Because of
the unusual scale of operation in the industry and the accidents of geography and
geology each country must develop its own answers. There is no magic formula to
promoting competitiveness through restructuring energy utilities in Ireland or
elsewhere in Europe.
Chapter 2
RF_STRUCTURING IRISH ENI£RGY UTILI771£S
John Fitz Gerald and Justin Johnston
So the ecooomists who wish to submit the production of public goods aJld
services to a regime of free competition are making a mistake which their
tone of self-assurance and levity makes all the more serious and
inexcusable. They have compromised political science as much as
economic science; they have brought confusion into the whole of social
science. (Walras)’
2. I. Introduction
The extreme openness of the Irish economy lends a special significance to the
role of competitiveness in promoting growth in output and employment.
Experience in the 1980s brought to the fore the importance to the industry and
market services sectors of the quality and cost of many public services such as
electricity, gas: and telecommunications. At the height of the recession in the
mid-1980s Ireland’s lack of competitiveness was aggravated by unfavourable
trends in the cost of such essential services. While the situation to-day is much
more satisfactory, it remains important for the overall health of the economy to
ensure that the cost of provision of these services is kept to the absolute minimum.
The world is not standing still aJ~d the changing environment for energ3; utilities in
Europe is promoting competition and putting pressure on their costs with obvious
implications for competitiveness. Recent developments in Northern Ireland further
emphasise the need for a reappraisal of the business in the Republic.
The role of competition in promoting the efficient allocation of resources has
long played a central role in economic thinking. However, as the quotation from
Walras, L., " The State and the Railways", translated by P. Hohnes, republished in Jounlal
of Public Economics, 1980.
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Walras indicates, perfect competition may not be socially optimal in an industu,
characterised by increasing returns to scale. With increasing returns to scale
monopoly is likely to be more efficient than competition by man5, small units. This
is the case in the instance Walras w~.s considering, railway networks. The energy
utilities are notable examples of firnas which have developed over time in many
European countries as monopolies exploiting the increase in efficiency inherent in
the provision of a single transmission network.
A drive to promote competition is apparent throughout the EU and in the
developing legislative programme of the Commission. Starting with the promotion
of competition through price transparency2 in the gas and electricity industries
(European Commission, 1992), the Commission followed with a proposal for the
promotion of third part3., access (TPA) to the European gas and electrici~,
networks (European Parliament, 1992) . They have also proposed the separation
of energy utilities into their different stages of production (unbundling).
In many other industries pressure to cut costs and maintain competitiveness
will come from competition. However, the monopoly structure of the indust~, in
Ireland means that government intervention may be required to bring about
change. This paper considers what should be the appropriate role for the
government in regulating and restructuring energy utilities over the rest of the
decade. There are two approaches which may be adopted to the problem of
ensuring that energy utilities minimise their cost of operation: the industry may be
restructured to increase competition where it is feasible and maximise
transparency; where this is not possible the goverument can regulate the industry
to t~’ and ensure that the costs of the monopoly operator are minimised
In this paper we consider the operations of both BGE and the ESB covering all
aspects of the gas and the electrici~, industries. The functions of energy utilities
are broadly divided into four separate stages3: generation of electricity (or
production of gas); the transmission throughout the country using a network of
wires or pipes; the distribution or deliver, from the main transformer stations to
the consumers; the sale to consumers over the network involving the metering of
consumption. Whereas the transmission and distribution sectors are natural
monopolies, elements of the generation and supply businesses are potentially
competitive.
The other papers at this conference consider the experience in Northern
Ireland, Britain and the Nordic countries. This paper first considers the structure
of the indust~, in Ireland and the possible extent of inefficiency. We then consider
bow the indust~, might be restructured to put pressure on all involved to minimise
"lqlis involves the publication of clear rules on the prices charged to different categories of
customer.
3 The 1927 Electricity (Supply) Act used this four why classification of the business.
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the .cost of production subject, of course, to important standards on security of
supply and safety. Finally we discuss how the industry, whatever its structure, can
best be regulated by the government.
2.2. The Energy Sector in Ireland
Measuring the competitiveness of the energy utilities is not a straightforward
task. While the most obvious measure may be the price paid by consumers for the
energy actually consumed, this is not necessarily an appropriate measure. First,
because of the increasing returns to scale in the indust~, and the special problems
faced supplying a substantial rnral market, the ESB and BGE are not directly
comparable to utilities operating elsewhere. Second, governments in the different
EU countries have adopted different environmental policies which invoh,e raising
prices through taxation and regulation to reflect the true cost to society of
consuming a "dirt3," good such as energy. In these cases the high price reflects the
wider costs to society, not inefficiency in production. Third, energy utilities in
different countries have been charged with additional objectives such as security of
supply and the related support of domestic coal (Gernaany) or domestic peat
(Ireland) industries.
A more appropriate objective for government is the minimisation of the costs
of production of energy. This Section first considers how the need to exploit
economies of scale in the indust~, in Ireland has resulted in a highly concentrated
monopoly structure. It then considers the cost structure of the industu,, to the
extent that costs are too high, resulting in "economic rents", there will be a loss of
welfare.
Increasing Returns and Monopoly
Energy utilities have developed over time in many European countries as state
owned integrated monopolies. In the past the monopoly structure of these
industries was justified by the need to improve the performance of energy markets,
in particular to exploit the benefits of scale economies. However, the structure of
the energy utility mdustries and the role of the state in managing these industries is
now being re-examined.
Underlying recent debate has been a concern that, while the industu,’s
monopol_v strncture has permitted the exploitation of increasing returns to scale,
the government has failed to hold prices to the true marginal cost of prodnction
and the indust~, has not minimised its total cost of production; prices have been
higher than necessary to sustain the industu, in the long run.4 Debate now
Ideally finns should price ~n long-run marginal cost. With increasing returns to sc~lle this will
not produce enough revenue to cover fixed costs. Fixed costs should ideally be recoul~zd by
charges which do not ~dl~ct consumer behaviour - Ibr example connection charges.
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concentrates on the possibility of introducing competition as the market should be
more efficient than the state at allocating production where increasing returns to
scale are not prevalent.
’The structure of the energy utilities in Ireland has evolved over many years in
response to government intervention and market forces. Nearly all the generation,
transmission and sale of electricity, is concentrated in the hands of the ESB and all
of the transmission and sale of gas is controlled by BGE. In the case of the ESB its
monopoly position goes back more than 60 years reflecting the need to nlaximise
the benefits to be obtained from large scale operation. The BGE monopoly is more
recent¯ Up to the 1980s there were a number of local privately owned monopolies
which controlled the supply of gas in individual cities. However, with the
introduction of natural gas and the creation of a transmission network in the
1980s, BGE took over all the functions previously handled by independent
companies.
¯ The small size of the economy interacting with the exploitation of the scale
economies in the indust~, has resulted in a highly concentrated structure in
electricity generation limiting the scope for competition. Currently there are only
15 significant thermal stations and the size distribution of these stations is shown
in Table 2. I. This shows that one station, Moneypoint, accounts for over 40 per
cent of the power produced and it is essential to the running of the system As a
result, there is currently little scope for developing competition between generating
stations, even if there were a change in their ownership.
Table 2.1: Size Distribution of 7hermal ElectriciO~ Generating Stations, 1991
Size of Plant             Number            Units ,Sent Out
Millions       % of 7btal
Less than or equal to 250 7
Greater than 250 - Less than 1000 4
Greater than 1000 - Less than 2000 3
Greater than 2000 - Less than 10:000 I
963 7.4
2,106 16.1
4,586 35. I
5,393 41.3
Tile absence of interconnection of tile electricity system with other European
networks means that the Irish system is unusually small and isolated. There is no
possibility of smoothing peaks in demand by drawing electrici~, from neighbouring
systems with different load profiles and there arc substantial extra costs due to the
need to maintain permanent reserves in the generating system For exanrple, at all
times a reserve equal to the largest generating unit on the system must be ready to
take over in case of break-down. These additional burdens reflect the importance
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of economies of scale in electricity networks (Helm, 1993). This places the
indust~, at a competitive disadvantage compared to other EU systems.
An interconnector between Northern Ireland (NI) and the Republic was
constructed in 1970 but, because of terrorist action, this line has been closed since
1975. However, as a result of recent political developments it is to be re-opened in.
1995. The failure to date to integrate the two systems has imposed considerable
costs on the two economics (McGurnaghan, 1990) and a major challenge for the
future will be how the current systems in the North and the Republic cao best be
integrated (McGurnaghan, 1994). There are substantial gains to be made from a
full integration to fornl a unified system with centralised decision making on tile
order in which the output from individual stations will be chosen (despatched).
This process of integration poses obvious problems for the political process;
the choice of location for new stations and the choice of redundant stations for
closure will obviously have difficult implications, even if the decisions are made on
a purely commercial basis. The process of integration also poses legal problems
given tile divergent path that the indust~, has taken in tile two jurisdictions. The
ultimate objective of integration should be a system which ensures the co-ordinated
despatch of generating stations to ensure that electricity is always produced at
lowest cost.s
For gas, the installation of an interconnector to Great Britain has ended the
isolation of the Irish system. For the next fcw years, while gas still flows from the
Marathon field, this will, at a price, i~acrcase the security of the Irish system by
providing an alternative source of supply. However, once that field is exhausted
Ireland will be once again dependent on a single pipe-line which is vulnerable to
accident or failure. The new pipeline gives access to additional sources of gas
supply which are essential for the survival of the indust~, and it also allows the
use of additional facilities in the UK, such as temporau, storage to cover peak
demand. The transmission of gas poses less problems than does that of electricity
and there is a lower loss in transmission so that the interconnector will make a
significant contribution to ending tile isolation of tile Irish system. However,
security of supply considerations will continue to restrict the potential penetration
of gas, in particular in the market for electricity generation.6
The small size of the Irish economy and the distribution of the population
within the count~, also affect tile energy utilities in their transmission, distribution
and supply functions. Ireland is unusnal by Northern European standards, not only
in the relatively high proportion of the population living in rural areas, but also in
This involves matching the demand and supply of power second by second by choosing tile
appropriate gencrating station to provide the marginal increment in electricity at least cost.
Oil site storage of g~m mid the possibility of switching generation from gas to gas oil at short
notice limit the exposure of the economy to any disruption of g~ls supplies.
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the dispersion of the population outside villages or small towns. The density of
population in Ireland is 51 per km2 compared to the EU average of 151,
Figure 2. I. This means that the load density (electriciu, sold) per km2 is extremely
low. The national load density is approximately 35kW/km" for electricity which
drops to an average of 20kW/km2 in rural areas of the countu,. These load
densities are about half the levels of other EU countries such as France. This
dispersion raises the overall cost of running the system and poses problems in
introducing competition.
Economic Rents
In the case of energy, utilities the objective of improving the overall
competitiveness of the economy focuses attention on the cost of production of
electricity and gas. With monopolies the results of the lack of competition may be
high production costs due to abnormal profits or economic rents, where the normal
rate of profit is that which is sufficient to remunerate the capital employed in the
industD,. The excess profits or economic rents can go to the owner - the
government or the private monopolist; they can go to the factors of production -
through unduly high prices, such as inflated wage rates, or through a wasteful use
of inputs, such as excessive staffing. In monopolies, especially, where state owned,
it is frequently the case that tile economic rent will be captured by, the employees
rather than by the government. It is also possible that the supplier of materials,
such as fuel,7 may extract some of the rent.
If the economic rent from over pricing by energy utilities accrued to the
government it would be available to reduce other distortionau, taxes or to fund
additional expenditure. Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992), suggest that a reduction in
taxes on labour funded by a broad energy tax would increase welfare. Thus an
7 For example, the price paid for peat in Ireland,
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exploitation by the state of its monopoly power as owner of energy utilities cotdd
have some offsetting benefits as the economic rent would be broadly similar to a
tax oo energy,. In the case of a private monopolist the situation would be rather
similar to that where the economic rent accrues to the employees; the income
would be unavailable to the government to reduce economic distortions elsewhere
in the economy.
Figure 2.2: Consumer Electricity Prices
Excluding VAT
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It is difficult to estimate the extent to which economic rents are earned in Irish
energy utilities as a result of unduly high production costs (including the cost of
capital - profits). As shown in Figure 2.2, in the case of electricity the current
price chargod to households is quite low by European standards. The price charged
to industry is also in the mid range of EU prices (Figure 2.3).
However, as discussed earlier, price comparisons are not a reliable indication
of the level of efficiency. There is evidence that the cost structu re of the ES B is too
high, in particular because of significant overstaffing in different parts of the
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enterprise. For example, the ESB themselves manage a gas-fired generating station
in Lancashire with far fewer employees than they have in comparable Irish
stations. Until the detailed studies undertaken of the cost structure of the industry
become available it is not possible to identif3, the full nature and extent of the
economic rents being earned by those working in the indust~,.
Figure 2.4: Average OztlpUl per BGE Employee
0OO’s Tonnes Oil Equivalent
2.5
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Source: 8GE.
BGE is also a state owned monopoly where there is a possibilit3, that the
economic rents may accrue to the employees. In the mid-1980s BGE took over the
existing private monopolies which produced and distributed gas in Dublin and
Cork. Tbc cost structure of these firn~s was clearly excessive and, as shown in
Figure 2.4, the amount of gas sold per employee has risen dranlatically over the
past decade showing a major improvement in efficienc3,. However, this does not
allow us to measure whether there is any persisting inefficiency as an increasing
proportion of the business has been contracted out reducing the numbers employed
directly.
Figure 2.5: EU Consumer Gas Prices
Excluding VAT
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The case of BGE is slightly different from the ESB in that gas faces much
more competition from other fuels in the markets in which it sells. While there are
no perfect substitutes for gas, electricity, diesel oil and bottled gas do provide
competition in different segments of the market,s Figure 2.5 shows a comparison
of the price of gas to households in Ireland compared to the situation in other EU
countries. This indicates that Irish pr!ces are not exceptional (though evidence on
the price to indust~, is not readily available). However, the fact that gas has, to
date, been available to BGE at a veu, low price has reduced the pressures on the
cost base and it means that the sale price is not a good measure of efficiency. The
prospect that BGE will in the near future have to buy gas at UK market prices
means that there will be further downward pressure on the rest of the cost base
over the rest of the decade.
The evidence suggests that, in practice, the bnlk of any economic rent in the
ESB has probably accrued to employees serving to improve their welfare at the
expense of distortions elsewhere in the economy. The situation in the gas industry
is rather different: in the 1970s and the 1980s much of the economic rent was
frittered away subsidising NET.9 Some of the remainder accrued to the
government as a dividend.
Why Worry?
"lqlc potential for earning economic rents through charging excessive prices is
of concern to public policy for four main reasons. First, by charging a higher price
than that which is needed to ensure long-run supply the market is getting the wrong
signal and firms and individuals will consume a sub-optinml amount of gas or
electricity, substituting other fuels and other goods for over-priced energy inputs.I°
Sc3:ond, it will adversely affect the competitiveness of the economy restdtiug in a
loss of output and employment in the tradable sector as output moves to foreign
destinations. Third, the higher price will have an income effect as consumers pay
higher prices for electricity. Income will be transferred from consumers to the
beneficiaries of the economic rents be they employees, the owners of a private
monopoly or the government. Fourth, high prices will affect the distribution of
income.
The research evidence suggests that the price elasticity of demand for ener~, is
low in both the industrial and the household sectors (Conniffe and Scott, 1990;
~qfilc electricity also faces competition in certain markets, such as space heating, in others,
such as light mid power for machineu,, there are no close substitutes.
9 NET was the state owned fcrtiliser company which exl:¢mded production in the 1970s using
cheap gas.
This ~lSSl.tllleS tlmt the filll cost of environmental d,’tllltlgc is incoqyorated into energy prices
through ml appropriate tax on inputs.
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Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 1993, and Conniffe, 1993). However, it is
likely that at the level of the individual fuel, such as electricity, the elastici~, of
substitution could be higher. However, even here the evidence suggests that the
likely distortions from inappropriate pricing are likely to be low, at least in the
short to medium term (Scot[, 1980 and Scott, 1991).
A much more important potential benefit from increasing efficiency in the
energy utility sector is the likely, effect on the competitiveness of the economy.
This issue was highlighted in the Culliton report (1992). The effect of reducing the
cost of energy will be to reduce the cost base of the tradable sector in Ireland
compared to its foreign competitors. This in turn will lead to an increase in
investment, output and employment in the sector.
A reduction in ener~, prices will also clearly, benefit consumers. It can be
expected that the reduction in consumer prices would, in turn, lead to some
moderation in the rate of increase in wage rates reflecting the increase in
purchasing power of wages consequent on the reduction in prices. This would
further improve the competitive position of the tradable sector.
Simulations using the ESRI Medium-Term Model suggest that the initial
impact of a cut in costs in energy, utilities of, for example, around £100 million,
through a reduction in employment of around 3000, would be a net loss of
employ~nent in the first ),ear of the reform. However, there would be a major
benefit to consumers as the price level would be reduced. In subsequent years the
loss in employment in utilities would be offset by increased employment in other
sectors of the economy as firms in the tradable sector would take advantage of
improved competitiveness to increase output and employment. In the medium term
total employment would, at worst, be unchanged and could be somewhat higher
than in a no change scenario. GNP would be significantly higber than in the no
change scenario. In the long tern1 it might be hoped that the creation of a more
competitive environment in the economy would have effects on other sectors
adding to the gains in welfare. In practice, in achieving such a reduction in staffing
it is likely that there will be significant restructuring costs. These costs and the
time taken to adapt will postpone the eventual economic benefits from increased
efficiency.
As shown in Figure 2.6 consumers with low incomes tend to spend a higher
proportion of their incomes on electrici~, and gas than better off households. As a
result, a reduction in energy utility prices is also likely, to have a progressive effect
on the distribution of income.
Of the four channels through which increased efficiency could improve welfare
in Ireland the most important is likely to be the effect on the overall
competitiveness of the economy. The improvement in efficiency in energy utilities
which has taken place over the last 10 ),ears has contributed to the recover3, in
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economic prospects. Increased efficiency would also have positive income
distribution effects. At least in the short to mediunl term the effects on allocative
efficiency are likely to be limited and~ while the energy utilities remain in State
hands, the albeit limited rent accruing to the government may, be assumed to be
used to offset other distortions.
Figure 2.6: Percentage of lr~:pendinlre Spent on Energy. by Income Group.
~;92.5
~117.8
~;t53.9
~193.2
~242.3
~3C0,0
~..380.4
~505.7
>505.7 r
0
I
]
]
I ’
I
!
%
12 14
2. 3. Restructuring the lndtlstcv
From the point of view of socieu, as a whole whether or not there will be ,’m
improvement in welfare from restructuring of the energy industries depends on the
extent to which existing economic rents are reduced through competition or
regulation - will there be an increase in effic!ency? In turn this will depend on the
balance between the costs of restructuring (contracting costs) and the benefits from
the increase in price transparency and competition.
The possibility of improving the efficiency of energy utilities through
restructuring can be considered under two broad headings -the level of integration
and ownership. The current energy utilities, the ESB and BGE, are highly
integrated firms covering ali stages of production and sales. The issues to be
considered here are the extent to which each of these firms should be broken up
into separate companies and, whatever the eventual structure, who should own the
resulting firms? To the extent that parts of the business can be producers in
competitive markets they, can be sold off or contracted out. As discussed in the
next Section, all the elements of the business, especially those which are natural
monopolies, shotdd be subject to comprehensive regulation by an independent
regulator, authority, whocver owns them.
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Level of Integration
The unbundling or break up of the ener~, utilities into a number of new firms
covering different stages of the production process may be beneficial if it allows
the separation out of the monopoly elements of the business and the introduction of
a competitive market for the remainder. The Irish government faces a choice
between restructuring the utilit)., industries by splitting up the different stages of
production, regulating the natural monopoly stages, or leaving such industries as
they are as vertically integrated monopolies, albeit with increased transparency in
their accounting procedures. If the latter option is chosen it will still be necessaq,
to regulate them to ensure efficient operation and protect the interests of
consumers. The choice between these two options depends on the costs and
benefits of integration.
Utilities are highly capital intensive industries and assets tend to be specific
and durable (e.g., power stations and transmission systems). Payoffs for new
projects may take as long as 15-20 years. To encourage firnas to invest in specific
assets long term contracts are necessary. However, because future contingencies
are hard to describe such contracts may be very costly (if not impossible) to write
(Coase, 1937 and Williamson, 1971). This is especially true at the co-ordinated
despatch stage (the decision on the order in which generators are to be used).
Therefore, any unbundling of the existing vertically integrated ener~, monopolies
will probably involve costs and some loss to societ7 which must be offset against
possible gains from increased competition.
The advantage of vertical integration under unified management is that
even a monopolist has the incentive to minimise costs, and to ensure that
internal transactions between the different stages are conducted efficiently:
If an industry is vertically disintegrated, then prices substitute for internal
planning and co-ordination, with the regulator influencing these prices. If
the prices are incorrect, then decisions may be inefficient. (Green and
Newbery, 1993)
The key to the options for restructuring the industq, lies in how the market for
utilities is operated. At the moment the despatch of electricity (choice of generation
station) is determined by the relevant section of the ESB which manages the
network using the full range of information available to them on costs and likely
demand. The decision on the priority in despatching (using) different generation
stations is complex as the cost of a unit of electricity will va~, from minute to
minute depending on the shape of the load curve and the characteristics of the
different generating stations.
In the UK the indust~, has moved from being organised as ,an integrated firm
to a situation where a number of individual firms decide their own futures and are
co-ordinated through a market mechanism - the pool - where electricity is traded
between a range of buyers and sellers. There are now signs that the new
independent firnas are tending to reintegrate through the establishment of long terna
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contractual agreements. In the Northern Ireland system the role of the market in
the UK is currently played by the power procurement section of Northern Ireland
Electricity which replaces the many buyers in the UK pool dealing directly with
the sellers of electricity.~ Clearly the power procurement function is a monopoly.
The choice of model for organising the industry in the Republic of Ireland depends
on the empirical evidence as to which one will minimisc the costs of co-ordination
- ensuring that electricity is produced at least cost over the course of the year and
that the optimal level of capacity is available at all times.
However, given the small size of the Irish economy there remains flae danger
that a rather complicated structure involving vertically separated elcmet)ts of the
existing monopolies could prove difficult and expensive to operate efficiently. The
costs involved in operating the UK electricity pool are high and some other
approach may be necessaD, in a small isolated system such as Ireland (Putnam,
Hayes and Bartlett, 1993). This suggests that if some other means can be found to
introduce competition into parts of the industo, it would be best to maintain the
current co-ordinated plarming model where a single firm or body is responsible for
seeing that electricity and gas are made available at minimum cost as and when
they are needed.
Whatever method is adopted, if competition is to be possible through new
entD, into the industt3, at may stage in the production process it is essential that the
rules used in despatching electricity be turned into information which is publicly
available on the cost of electricity bought and sold at different times of day (and
possibly in different regions). Without such information to drive the market,
competition is likely to result in a less efficient use of existing resources than under
the current integrated system.
Competition
Faced with the need for increased efficiency in public utilities what is the
appropriate response for government? In restructuring the energy utilities a major
objective of policy should be to promote competition where returns to scale are
constant or decreasing. Competition can be brought about either by a combination
of privatisation and new entr3.,~-~ or through contracting Out a range of services
currently undertaken within the monopoly firm.
The approach adopted in the UK has been to privatise the industry and to t~,
and create an environment where the privatised firms compete. An alternative
related way of increasing efficiency would be to leave ownership of the assets with
the current operators while most of the services and goods used by the utilities
could be bought through a competitive tendering process. This latter approach has
~ Ill duc course this arrangenlenl is to be superseded by o pool or nmrket mechanism (Offer,
1993).
Experience from the UK electricity industry suggests that Io create competition it is not
sufficient to break up ~l monopoly into two finns (Hehn, 1993).
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been widely adopted in managing public infrastructure in France (see Lorrain,
1994). Here we consider in turn the two main energy utilities - electricity and gas.
We first consider what aspects of the business of the utilities are amenable to
competition and we then examine the different ways in which competition might be
introduced.
Electricib,
The crucial issue to be considered is the extent to which the existing
integrated company should be separated into its different business functions -
transmission, generation etc. and, whatever the eventual structure, who should own
the resulting firms?
In the case of generation, as with the rest of the system, the objective of
reorganisation is to minimise or even eliminate economic rents by changing the
incentives facing the operators and suppliers of the individual stations. However,
even if electricity generation is not a natural monopoly and competition is possible
elsewhere in Europe, the small size of the Irish economy may give rise to local
monopolies. As discussed above, this is reflected in the size distribution of
generating stations with the Moneypoint station commanding a dominant position
in the ESB system. The san~e is true in Northern Ireland where two stations
dominate the system. This highlights the potential difficulties in developing
competition in a small system such as that of the Republic of Ireland.
As economic rents in generation are most likely to accrue to the employees
rather than to the current owner, instead of seeking to change ownership it would
be more appropriate to concentrate on changing incentives through contracting out.
The extensive use of contracts for providing the different services needed to
operate the generation stations, while still leaving ownership in the hands of the
state, would help put pressure for increased efficiency in operation. At the very
least the nmintenance of the stations could be undertaken on a contract basis. A
further stage could involve putting the management of stations out to tender, just
as the ESB itself has tendered For management contracts in the UK. The
contractors would have ever3., incentive to minmlise costs while the competition for
the contracts would mininaise the possibility of excess profits for the contractors.
Because the capital costs would still be borne by the ESB, the risks incurred by
contractors would be minimised thus making entu, into the market easier.
However, it is likely that as well as moving towards a policy of contracting for
services in the generation sector, freedom of entu, for new operators should also be
pursued. With changing technolo~, it is now possible that smaller plants may be
economic in certain segments of the market, for example combined heat and
power. This opens up the possibility for some competition for production of
electricity. However, to allow such a market to develop it will be necessau, to
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increase transparency in the electricity system as a whole and, in particular, to
have a transparent calculation of the costs and benefits of a marginal unit of
electricity at different times of day and in different regions¯
It is clear that the transmission network is a natural monopoly in Ireland as in
the rest of the E U.~S The distribution of electricity involves transporting it from the
main transmission network to the individual household or industrial or conmlercial
consumer. The management of the transmission system or the despatch function is
clearly a monopoly and must remain a central function of the utilits_, which runs the
electricity system. Centralised despatch is the key to reaping the benefits of scale
from the operation of an integrated sy,stem. As discussed above, the cost of
developing and running a pool system in Ireland would be unlikely to justif3, the
potential benefits. Therefore to ensure transparency and a free flow of information
it is desirable that it remain in government ownership~ unlike the situation in
Northern Ireland.~a However there remains the possibility that much of the design,
construction and maintenance of the physical infrastructure could be conducted on
a contract basis rather than using internal resources. This is the policy which has
been adopted by BGE in managing the development of their transmission network.
BGE over the last 10 years has undertaken a major shift to contracting out so that
the bulk of those now employed in the gas mdustry are not employees of BGE.~5
The distribution function is also likely to remain a state owned monopoly,
though here again the possibility of increased use of contracting out could well
introduce serious competition into the sector putting downward pressure on costs.
Finally, the supply of gas and electricity to households involves potentially
buying the product from the producers, paying for use of the network, and
metering and collecUng revenue from consumers. It is theoretically possible to
have competition at this level with different suppliers operating over the same
network and having different packages of services which they snpply to
consumersJ6 It is also possible that a single supplier could provide consumers with
both gas and electricity (and other utilities) if there were significant economies of
The one exception to this is the ESI3 itself which could potentially act as its os~T1 distributor
of gas, taking it from the BGE translnission network and building its ox~T1 pipe-line to new
gas-fired geueration stations.
Unlike Northern Ireland, the constitutional basis of law in the Republic of lrelmld makes for
a significant difference in operating environment for private and public finns¯ In tile c~lse of
private finns file constitutional fight to private property might potentially be invoked to limit
tile flow of infonnatian to the regulator whereas this is not possible for semi-state companies
(see Convery and Scott, 1990).
t5 Aalother interesting exmnple of this pattern is Bord na Mona.
For example, one supplier might offer different prices for constanption at different times of
the day while maother offers u common price. Others might offer interruptible or Iong-teml
coutr~lcL~.
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scale in metering (Graham and Marvin, 1994). However, the experience elsewhere
on the potential savings to be obtained from such an innovation is unclear. It seems
desirable that the possibility of new entrants should be facilitated by accounting
changes to ensure increased transparency within the electricity system. It may be
that the threat of entu, may force a full and timely exploitation by the existing
operator of new technology to provide new products.
The other functions of the ESB, retailing and consultancy, are not central to
the work of supplying electricity. The consultancy service increasingly operates in
a competitive market and it is not clear that it need remain indefinitely in public
ownership. A similar argument applies to their retail operations.
Gas
The scope for introducing further competition in gas through unbundling and
privatisation is more limited than in electricity. Already, unlike electricity, gas
faces competition in most of its main markets from alternative fuels. The network
elements of the gas industu, are clearly a natural monopoly. However, it is
important that the costs of transmission be separately identified. There is already
one cnstomer for use of the BGE transmission network the - ESB If new ent~, is
to be allowed into generation using gas then other new potential users of the
transmission system may appear. To allow competition the pricing of the network
elements of the gas system should be made as transparent as possible. This is
facilitated by the approach of BGE who have sub-contracted the construction of
the network through competitive tender allowing a ready identification of the
capital costs.
A case could be made for having separate regional distribution companies, as
previously existed in Cork and Dublin. However, the benefits of this can probably
be obtained more easily by the adoption of transparent accounting procedures
allowing the regulator to assess efficiency in the distribution system in different
regions. The increasing use by BGE of contractors to build and maintain the
distribution network is introducing competition into the provision of this service,
helping ensure that costs are minimised.
It is only really in the supply of gas that competition through the entry of
multiple enterprises is a theoretical possibility However, even here it is not clear
that new entrants are likely. The concentration on contracting for services and
maintenance should put downward pressure on the cost base leaving relatively
little scope for economic rents sufficient to attract in new entrants.
Privatisation
Where competition can readily be introduced, either throngh breaking up and
selling an existing enterprise or through new entry, there is a clear case for private
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ownership. Tile issues are more complex in the case of enterprises which are
natural nlonopolies. The key to this question lies in whether a change in ownership
will reduce the economic rents inherent in the operation of the monopoly: will it be
more efficient and will the benefits of the increased efficiency be passed on to
consumers? A secondary issue which is often discussed is the impact of a change
in ownership on the public finances.
Privatisation of the natural monopoly elements should only be considered if the
value of tile natural monopoly to the potential purchaser is greater than the value
to the government. The potential for higher profitability of all energy utility in
private hands derives partly from the possible additional scope for a privatised
firm to equate employees wages to their marginal products:17 through the reduction
of excessive staff levels or from the possibility of shifting the distribution of
monopoly rents from suppliers.
Tile ability of the state to extract this increase in wealth from the privatised
monopolist so that welfare is improved: however, will depend on the ability of the
regulator to ensure that the monopolist charges a price which is equal to the
marginal cost of production (marginal social cost).Is If the higher value to the
private owner derives from a greater exploitation of tbe monopoly, power of the
utility then welfare will be disimproved through privatisation.
Another potential advantage of privatisation is that a government may be able
to reduce its exposure to risks arising from the large scale investments which the
industry involves. A profit maximising private owner should have a strong
incentive to control the costs of large investment projects. The price which this
reduction in the state’s exposure to risk involves is that private owners are likely to
have to pay higher interest rates on their borrowing reflecting the higher risks;
governments can not go bankrupt whereas private firms, even energy utilities: can.
This higher cost of capital must be passed on as higher prices to consumers.
However: this assumes that the government can actually shed the risks
involved in major energy utility investment projects by privatisation. The
experience in the US mad elsewhere is that where private operators have made veq,
unwise investments it has not provcd possible for the regulator to insist that the
private owner should pay for the consequences of foolhardy decisions; tile
consequences of the bankruptcy, of private utilities have proved too ax~fful to
contemplate. As a result consumers have ended up paying tile price of both the
unwise investment and the higher price paid by the utility for the capital borrowed
to undertake that investment.
~7
"lq]e finn will m~ximise profits where the cost of i~roducin8 an ~dditional unit of output
equals file revenue from selling that additional unit of output.
~s The problem facing the regulator, however, is similar Io the principal and agent problem.
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If the incidence of the costs arising from unwise investment decisions will fall
on the government or tile consumer, rather than the private owners or financiers,
there is a strong ease for direct government involvement in financing and
overseeing the construction of power plants or other major energy infrastructure.
The government can borrow more cheaply than can the private sector and,
depending on the regulator, regime, it may also have greater incentives than the
private sector to ensure that the construction is undertaken in an efficient manner.
The government’s legitimate interest in seeing that costs of construction are
minimised can be protected through ownership or else through some special forms
of regulation.
A seeonda~, issue to be considered in deciding whether a state monopoly
should be privatised is the benefit to the government’s finances. In recent years in
the UK and elsewhere utilities have been sold off, partly to raise funds for the
government. However, many of the arguments on this issue have been ill-informed,
viewing all the receipts from the sale of the utility as a net gain of resources to the
government. This approach is seriously flawed reflecting the fact that governments
rarely publish a balance sheet showing their assets and liabilities (Vickers and
Yarrow, 1991).
For a private firm the sale ofa subsidia~, results in a reduction in the value of
the subsidiaries in its balance sheet which is exactly offset by a new asset, the cash
receipts from the sale. Similarly, for the government the total assets, if sold for
their book value, are identical before and after the sale. Even if all the receipts are
applied to pay,ing off existing debt the net worth of the government is not changed
by the transaction. Thus arguments for privatisation suggesting that it can allow a
reduction in the national debt are a mirage as they are concentrating on only, one
component of the government’s balance sheet. In practice in the UK, to ensure the
political success of privatisation, the assets have been sold off for less than their
book value.
Other Objectives
It is important that the social and environmental obligations of the energy
utilities should be spelt out in detail before restructuring. This will be essential if
competition is to be introduced into segments of the industu,. If the social and
environmental obligations are left unclear this will create uncertainty discouraging
future investment. Failure to do so may also result in new distortions in the
industD, as the industry is liberalised. For example, if the issue of the appropriate
level of cross-subsidisation of rural consumers by urban consumers is left unclear,
competition could lead to cherry-picking by new entrants choosing to serve only
low cost consumers, possibly introducing new distortions in the market.
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The case of the peat fired generation stations is another example wberc policy
should be made explicit. Unrestricted competition in electricity generation would
rapidly result in the closure of the peat-fired stations. If there is a regional policy
objective of providing employment in the relevant areas this would better be
achieved by offering all explicit subsidy for such employment which is equal to the
current excess burden of maintaining existing stations,m This wotdd have the
benefit that if a different industu, could provide more employment than is currently
provided by the peat industry the), would be free to do so.
In the case of the environmental regulations an appropriate framework should
be designed covering not merely the energy utilities but the rest of the economy.
This should preferably involve the conversion of environmental controls into taxes.
Where this is not possible emission quotas should be tradable with the quotas
being auctioned off by the state at intervals of a few years. Unless there is a
market in quotas or there is a common tax rate the environmental controls could
act as a serious restraint on new entry.
The possible integration of the two energy systems on this island poses a
partictdar challenge in the area of environmental regulation. Given the different
quotas for sulphur dioxide enlissions assigned to the two parts of the island the
shadow price of the emission quota will differ. Unless trade in quotas is allowed on
the island this may give rise to some distortion in the market, making entry easier
in one jurisdiction than in another. If the difference in quotas represented a real
diffcrence in tbe absorptive capacity of the atmosphere in the two parts of Ireland
then the difference in quotas would have a meaning. However, as the allocation of
a quota to Northern Ireland within the UK is itself arbltrau’ and the allocation of
quotas between countries is also fairly arbitrary, this is unlikely to be the case. All
this highlights the potential distortions which may arise from a failure to use fiscal
instruments to implement environmental policy within the EU.
A final and rather similar issue arises in the case of the implementation of the
fuel diversity requirements in a competitive market. Because of the dependence of
the gas supply on a single pipe-line it is important that the level of dependence on
gas is limited. Already arotmd a quarter of electricity is generated from gas and the
scope for fiJrther incrcase is limited. This need to restrict dependence on gas could
prevent new entry into the market. While it may never prove necessary to restrict
dependence on gas, if it does, to avoid distortions, it may be desirable to treat the
limitation on gas usage in a similar manner to the need to limit emissions of
pollutants. As with restrictions on emissions, the appropriate response to the fuel
diversity requirement may be to sell any gas "quota" by periodic auction and allow
Ill c~dclllalin/g the excess burden llCCOtlnl must bc taken of tile sunk cost represented by the
13ord lm Montl debt (Nic Giolla Choille, 1993).
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these quotas to be tradfible or, alternatively, to tax gas so as to limit its
attractiveness,z°
2."4. A Re~datocv Structure
The purpose of regulation is to try and ensure that, in the absence of
competition, the monopolist (private or public) has incentives to minimise costs
and to restrict prices to a level at which the capital employed is adequately (but not
excessively) remunerated, while ensuring that the level of investment is sufficient
and the quality of the product is maintained. Under perfect competition this can be
left to market forces. Environmental standards for both monopoly and competitive
elements must also be met.Today the Department of Energy effectively fills the
role of "regulator’ for energy utilities.
Even if the objective of the regulator is clearl), stated (though frequently the
regulator may be charged with a range of different objectives), in practice the
regulator faces a major problem in obtaining sufficient information to determine
what is the appropriate rate of return on capital, what is the appropriate level of
investment, what is the appropriate price to charge for the outputs of the
monopolist and what is the appropriate price for the monopolist to pay for its
inputs. If the industry is restructured and split into its monopoly and competitive
elements, the monopolist Will have an incentive to minimise the flow of infommtion
to the regulator. The control of infonnation is thus a key issue.
The design of a regulator, regime can be specified in such a way that the
behaviour of the monopolist (public or private) provides information to the
regulator. For example, one obvious way of extracting infommtion is to auction
the right to a monopoly. In this case the firms which are likely to be most efficient
will bid the highest price telling the regulator that the), are the most efficient.
(However, this approach has other disadvantages in terms of incentives.)
Where full information is not available to the regulator, decentralising decision
making may be more effective: the regulator sets certain simple ground rules and
the utility then seeks to maximise profit or minimise costs within the context of the
regulator,., franlework. A variant of this is the break-up of a monopoly into a series
of local monopolies in different locations, all with different cost structures. This
may allow the regulator to determine where there is waste and inefficiency in
individual monopolies. This approach forms the basis of "benchmarking". In
practice, there are many dimensions to the problems facing the regulator and
This highlights the fact that the fuel diversity requirement conflicts with the eiwironmental
need to restrict emissions, especially of carbon dioxide. "fhe fi~el diversity requirement may
necessitate a higher tax on gas whereas the cnviromnental imperative may favour a lower tax
on gas. Obviously if relative prices moved against gas or if new gas were Ibtmd off Irish
shores this potential conllict might be eased in the future.
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simple rules, such as auctions of licences, may not result in optimal behaviour by
the monopolist.
in designing the regulatou, regime there is no obvious or unique set of
incentives which will produce an optimal result in terms of maximising social
welfare. If, as in the United States, the regulator concentrates on controlling the
rate of return on capital employed this can give rise to a number of problems. This
regime encourages overcapitalisation - the higher the capital stock the higher the
allowable profits. It also provides less incentive to control the cost of major
investment in plant, given that the rate of return may be allowed on investment in
all plant even if the cost is excessive. To counter this problem the regulator may
have to determine what is allowable cost. However, this in turn adds to uncertainty
and may further distort decision making (Vicl~crs and Yarrow, 1991).
A different approach has been adopted in the UK where the allowable price is
calculated with respect to the price of other products (e.g., the consumer price
index) but this may also lead to inappropriate incentives. In this case the inceutive
to invest will be reduced. In addition, the specification of the appropriate
relationship between the gro~¢h in energy prices and consumer prices, for
example, requires detailed knowledge of the working of the indust~, and the
potential for cost saving. If the price margin is too large the indust~, may end up
being allowed to charge a monopoly price leading to allocative inefficiency
(Yarrow, 1992); alternatively mistakes by the regulator could result in too small a
margin to remunerate capital. In addition, to the extent that the formula de facto
allows for a pass through of costs, e~,,en small anlounts of vertical integration can
reduce incentives to put downward pressure on input prices: a higher price for
inputs which are produced by the firm itself can be passed through to consumers.
In the UK separate regulatory frameworks have been set up for the different
utilities. While each of the industries has special characteristics there are common
problems facing regulators of all energy utilities (and of telecommunications).
Under these circumstances, given the small size of the country and the limited
resources available it may be desirable to have a single regulatou, authority to deal
with all utilities (including telecommunications), whoever o~ls them. The
experience and problems with one utility may well provide guidance in dealing
with the others. It may only be through having a single regulatou, authority that
this cross-fertilisation can be achieved.
Restructuring in Ireland should aim to increase the flow of information to the
regulator. A first prerequisite in restructuring both the ESB and BGE is that the
different business activities should be separated for accounting purposes to
improve tr,’msparency. Even if the utilities are not to be dismantled into their
separate business components this stage will be necessary to facilitate adequate
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regulation of the continuing monopoly elements (and also because of EU
legislation).
There is also the problem that political interference with the regulation process
may produce sub-optimal results. Just because ownership is changed or a regulator
is introduced gives no guarantee that tile resulting regime will produce tile desired
improvement in welfare. For exanlple, if the regulator controls prices and the
regulator is, in turn: anlenable to short-term political influence, then the result may
be a price below the long run marginal cost. Tile possibility of such a regime will
itself discourage investment. Part of the problem with the current regime is that the
Department of Energy has multiple objectives, objectives which shift in priority
over time. It is both the major shareholder and the regulator. This has provided a
very uncertain rcgulatory framework.
Any regulator)., regime should concentrate on providing a reasonably certain
environment for all those engaged in the energy utility, industry. To this end it is
necessary to spell out the objectives of the regulator and to guarantee the
regulator)., authority sufficient independence to cant out its task.21 Therefore: the
regulator), authority needs to be given a simple set of objectives and sufficient
independence from political interference which is essential if it is to act
successfully. As discussed above, the uncertainty brought about by political
interference can prove ve~, costly in an industry as capital intensive as the energy
sector. Talking of the UK Helm and Yarrow (1988) say:
the absence of a clear and stable longer-tern] incentive structures has been
one of the most criticised features of control of public enterprise in the
UK, and that policy weakness has thus far been perpetuated in the control
franlework for privately owned utilities.
The availability of information to the regtdator on all aspects of the operation
of the industry is essential to its success. However, even with good will or legal
powers there is still no guarantee that a regulator will be able to obtain and use the
information needed to regulate tile industry. Man), technical issues are involved in
designing and implementing ,an appropriate regulator: regime. It may prove
difficnlt to obtain the expertise needed to staff a regulator3, authority. The experts
themselves are likely to come from the energy utilities and they may well see their
career paths involving a return to the companies which the), are regulating,
weakening their fortitude and zeal.
In setting up a regulatory authority there is always the danger that some of the
monopoly rents may be captured by the authority itself. The httge sums of money
involved and the vital rote of the regulator3, authority make it impossible to give it
full independence; it is vital that the regulator), authority itself is subject to audit
’~ R~tther similar issues underlie tile discussion on tile independence of Central Banks.
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and accountable in some sense to the wider public. To avoid undue political
interference, while providing some control, it may be desirable to make the
regulator directly answerable to the Dail (like the Ombudsman).
5. Conclusions
This paper has considered the reasons why tile structure of the current ener~,
utilities - the ESB and BGE - should be reviewed. It argnes that the
circumstances of the indust~, in Ireland are rather different from those in the UK
or continental Europe because of its isolated status. As a result, the solutions
adopted elsewhere may not necessarily be appropriate in Ireland. In particular,
there are some elements of energy utility industries in Ireland where, even if
competition is possible elsewhere, the small size of the Irish economy gives rise to
local monopolies.
We argue that the crucial objective should be to introduce competition into the
industry in Ireland wherever it is realistically possible. However, it may still be
desirable to keep the bulk of the existing physical assets in state ownership while
opening up the market to new entrants wherever feasible. In the circumstances in
Ireland competition can probably best be introduced in a wide range of areas
through contracting out of services such as: the maintenance of gas pipes and
generating stations; the construction of new sections of the transmission network;
the management of electricity generating stations. Significant progress has already
been made with this approach in BGE (and Bord na Mona) and it has the
advantage that it can be introduced gradually.
The monopoly elements of the energy utility industq, should be subject to
comprehensive regulation by an appropriate attthority. However, even where
competition is possible, regulation will still be uccessau, to ensure that it actually
happens. A single regulator, authority, should probably cover all utilities, certainly
all energy, utilities, to minimise the costs and maximise the efficiency of regulation.
The regulator needs a clear set of objectives and an independent status while still
being accountable to the public in some broader sense.
A major challenge for the future will be how the current systems in the North
and the Republic can best be integrated to the mutual advantage bf both parts of
the island. This poses obvious problems for the political process. However, it also
poses serious legal problems given the divergent path that the indust~, has taken in
the two jurisdictions.
The full resolution of these problems needs further study but the key to
success lies in designing a system which both provides for the integrated despatch
of electricity and which also maximises the flow of information to the regulator to
allow for effective intervention.
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Chapter 3
IL’LI;CTRICITY PIUVA TISA TION: THE NORTHERN IIUZI.,ANI.) F_.XI)IZI~II~SVCI~
Michael McGurnaghan, The Queen’s University of Belfast
The various views mid objectives in Northern Ireland concerning
competition not only conflict but are often unrealistic, assuring
disappointment as competition and its effects are further defined.
(Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, 1993).
3. I. Introduction
This paper deals primarily with. the way privatisation was undertaken in the
particular circumstances of the Northern Ireland (NI) electricity, industD, and its
proposed future development. Althougla a major objective of privatisation was to
introduce competition in order to achieve the lowest possible prices and greater
choice for customers, the new strncture was designed initially to be monopolistic in
a number of significant ways because the small size mad isolated nature of the
system posed special problems. However, provision was made for these
arrangements to be changed subsequently to create a more competitive and
efficient iodustD,, hi that context, there are a number of planned developments
involving a wholesale electricity trading system (or Pool) and gas mad electricity
intercozmections witb Great Britain (GB), but difficulties surround the ability of
these nleasures to have all effective impact on the curreut situation for some time.
As a result, price regulation assumes a crucial role in replicating a competitive
market.
Furthermore, there has been a long-standing commitment by both the British
mad Irish authorities to restore the electricity, interconnector between NI and the
Republic of Ireland (ROI) when tbc security situation permitted. Originally, this
link operated from 1970 until 1975 when it was abandoned following a sustained
bombing canlpaign. During this short period, it provided mutual reserve capacity
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between the utilities’ in both jurisdictions. Since then: Northern Ireland Electricib,
(NIE) and the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) have been’ isolated from each other
and also from any other system, unlike most parts of the European Union (EU)
which are interconnected to some extent within the wider objective of developing
trans-Enropean energy, networks, particnlarly linking peripheral regions. With the
cessation of violence, the NI-ROI intereonnector should be reopened by April
1995. Its potential benefits could be significant, but the differing market
circumstances in recent ),ears and the respective paths the systems might take in
the future makes the longer term effects uncertain.
Including this introduction, the paper is divided into seven sections. As a
background, the next section reviews the structural features which prevent the NI
electricity systerrt achieving comparable levels of operational efficiency with
respect to the industu, in GB, and results in relatively higher electricity costs.
Section 3 outlines the privatisation objectives and the reorganised structure in NI,
particularly how it differs from the privatised utilities in the rest of the United
Kingdom (UK). Section 4 exanlines the future planned developments to promote
competition in the generation and supply sectors. A brief review of UK regional
electricity price trends over recent years is given in Section 5, followed by an
analysis of NI price regulation. Section 6 outlines the potential advantages
afforded to both systems from reopening the cross-border interconnector.
However, its longer term benefits await further clarification. Section 7 provides a
conclusion.
Figure 3. I : Primary IZnerg.v Supplies in Northern Ireland. 1993
Note: nat = million to~mes; mtoe = million tonnes ofoil equivalent; I mt = 0.6 mtoe.
I. Includes butame, prolxane, naphtha, burning oil and gas/diesel oil, exchlding den’.
2. hlcludes aviation spirit, motor spirit, aviation turbine fuel and defy fuel.
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3. Z Regional Characteristics
At present, NI has the smallest, isolated electricity system in the EU and is
almost totally dependent on two imported fuels, oil and coal, for its energy needs.
There is no network gas supply, nuclear, substantial renewable resources or other
indigenous fuel sources which have been developed commercially. There are
extensive lignite deposits estimated at I:000 million tonnes but these have not yet
been exploited (Northern Ireland Economic Council, 1987). As Figure 3.1 shows,
oil provided 70 per cent of primary energy, needs in 1993 with electricity
generation using 43 per cent of total supplies. As Table 3.1 shows, there are four
power stations comprising 23 generating sets (including 5 gas turbines for peak
demand) with a maximum installed capacity., of 2243 MW, all under contract to
NIE. The system is dominated by two stations, Ballylumford and Kilroot, which
together account for just under 75 per cent of total system capacity; Belfast West
and Coolkceragh are relatively old and nearing their scheduled retirement dates.
With a large proportion of generating capacity, oil-firing, the cost of generation has
been sensitive to changes in its price.
Table 3. I : Northern Ireland Generation
Power Station Units/Fuel Capaci~, Mll; Contract E.rpily Dates Earliest Cancellation
(Outlet) (Under of Genelztting Unit Dates I Nol,ember
Cataract) Agreements 31 March
Ballylum fordt 6Oil 951 2006-2010                   2010
(13ritish Gas) 2 Gas Turbines 116 2020 2010
Belfast West 5 Coal 240 1997-1998 (120 MW) 1996
(Nigcn) 1998-1999 ( 120M W) 1998
CoolKeeragh 5 Oil 300 2000-2001 (120 MW) 1998
(Management 2002-2004 ( 180 MW) 2000
Employees) I Gas Turbine 58 2020 2000
Kilroot 2 Oil/Coal 390 on coal 2024 2010
(Nigcn) 520 on oil
2 Gas Turbines 58 2024 2010
Scottish 240 15 years non-cancellable
hlterconnector agreement with Scottish
(NIE) Power
Source: McGunlaghan ( 1994 ).
i    13allylumford is CXlXZcted to convert to gas-firil|g in 1997.
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Lacking any established interconnection with an adjacent system, there are
economic difficulties inherent in a small "island" system. Generating sets are
relatively large which means that there are strict operational constraints and a high
reserve requirement for reasons connected with security of supply. For example,
there is a so-called "22 per cent" (or "5 set") rule by which no generating set may
supply more than around 20 per cent of demand at any time. This means that each
power station must be run at some part of ever), day and so has an effective
monopoly over a particular section of the load curve. Also, there must be spinning
reserve equal to at least 68 per cent of the generation of the largest set used.
System size also means that not all possible economies of scale in generation can
be obtained.
Consequently, the amount by which generating eapacity exceeds peak demand
is relatively large in the NI system. With a maximum demand of approximately
1500 MW, there is currently a system reserve margin of approxinmtely 50 per cent
which is much greater than NIE’s own relatively high generation security standard
of 40 per cent which is considered necessary to secure supply (Offer NI, 1993). In
addition, a low population density, approximately half that of the UK level and
varying considerably within the region, requires a fairly widely-spread and
relatively expensive transmission and distribution network.
In accordance with EU legislation, the UK is committed to reduce
progressively emissions of sulphur dioxide (SOX) and oxides of nitrogen (NOX)
from power stations and other large combustion plants~ (European Commission,
1988). As Appendix I shows, NI’s share of these pollution control limits has been
allocated solely to the electricity industry so that there is a SOX "bubble" for the
period 1993 to 2003 and a NOX "bubble" for the period 1993-1998 (Department
of the Enviromnent for NI, 1994). These apply both on an aggregate and
individual plant level, in an increasingly tighter manner, although only the overall
target is really relev~mt,z Given the existing generating fuel mix, compliance with
EU and UK emission abatement legislation will have increasingly significant
implications for future tariffs because the regulatou, regime allows these
additional generating costs to be passed to customers (see Section 5).
In accordance with the EC Large Combustion Plants (LCP) l)irectivc, the UK issued its
Progranune and National Plan (December 1990) Ibr reducing emissions of SOX and NOX
from existing LCPs. Measured from a 1980 baseline, the National Plan reqnires SOX
reductions of 20 per cent by 1993, 40 per cent by 1998 and 60 per cent by 2003 ~4th NOX
reductions of 15 per cent by 1993 and 30 lYcr cent by 1998.
With responsibility for central despatch, these ceilings arc managed by NIE which c~ln
arrange quota-switching *is the ),ear progresses to enable least cost generation, provided the
aggregate is not breached. This ensures that a particular power station does not cease
olx:rating due to having reached its emission limit for thai year. Effectively, therefore, the
emission limits are not controlled by the generating comt~mies who are also inumme
financially from the cost of compliance.
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As a result, tile price of electricity in NI has been typically higher than the GB
average (see Table 3.3 and Section 5). In accordance with the Government’s
current energy strategy of diversi~,ing the generation fiJel mix, it is planned to
remove some of these system constraints by the construction of a gas pipeline and
electricity interconnector with Scothand, due towards the end of the centu~,
(assuming file latter proceeds as anticipated3), with 177 MECU allocated under the
existing Structural Funds Programme (Department of Economic Development
(DED), 1992a; European Commission, 1994). The Ballylumford power station
was sold to British Gas on the basis that a gas pipeline link would be built and the
plant converted to use natural gas (House of Commons, 1992). This would
improve diversification with the generation mix becoming 40 per cent gas, 20 per
cent oil and 40 per cent coal. Following the commissioning of the new gas
interconnector, it is expected that a natural gas market will develop (NIE, 1994).
In addition, the Scottish interconnector would supply sufficient power to meet
about 20 per cent of total demand and further divcrsi~, the sy,stem. However, the
costs of these new sources of electricity will tend to increase electricity prices, but
it is anticipated that their effects would lead to lower costs in the longer term.
3. 3. New Structure
Until vesting, the NI electricity industry was organised as a vertically
integrated monopoly. This previous structure was NIE which exercised virtual
control over all aspects of the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of
electricity in tile region.4 Although the market was opened in 1987 for independent
generation to supply electricity to NIE or directly to customers using the grid
network, NIE’s integrated generation and distribution operations created effective
ent~, barriers. Furthemlore, privatisation was being considered against a
background where NIE had been in subsidy some years previously, aligning
electricity prices with the highest in England and Wales, and was still fomlally
(until 1990) in a situation where it could continue to be subsidised, if it fell into
deficit (McGurnaghan, 1990).
As Chart 3. I shows, the intention to privatise NIE was first armounced in July
1988 (Official Report, 1987-88). This extension of the electricity privatisation
progranlme then being formulated within tile wider national sphere is worth noting
because of the implicit belief that similar benefits would accrue to consumers in N I
as those expected to be achieved in GB, regardless of the structure chosen in the
light of the industD,’s special circumstances. These perceived benefits were
summed up in the foml of six objectives, four contained in the White Paper of
Currently, dae Scottish intcrcomlector is subject to public inquiries in both NI tuld Scotland.
It was also engaged in appliance retailing through a chain of High Street outlets and
undczlcok consultancy and Olxzrational work on an international basis.
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Figure 3.2: The NI Electricity System
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CHART 3.1: PRIVATISATION OBJECTIVES
(House of Commons, July 1988)
The Government are deternained that the benefits from private sector
invoh,ement in the electricity supply industry should be available to
Northern Ireland consumers as the), will be to those in the rest of the
United Kingdom.
MAIN OBJECTIVES (White paper of March 1991)
to introduce, whenever possible, fornls of competition which will result
in the lowest possible prices for consumers;
to regulate the electricity supply industry in a way that will protect consumers’
interests and maintain sccnrity and safety of supply without being unduly
intrusive;
to diversi~, further the Northern Ireland economy through the introduction of
enterprising new participants into the power sector; and
to promote participation by employees of N IE and by electricity consumers in
the ownership of the industr),.
7URTHER OBJECTIVES (Deparmaent of Economic Development, NI)
as a result of the flotation oFNIE plc, to widen and deepen share ownership,
in particular in Northern Ireland, and to establish a modest premium in the
immediate aftern~arkct; and
to maximise the net proceeds, taking the sales of the generating stations and
N IE plc together.
March 1991 which outlined the particular model proposed for NI with a fnrther
two set subsequently by the DED, the body responsible for energy policy in NI
(DED, 1991). Basically, there were two main aims: to introduce competition,
wherever possible, as a means of increasing efficiency to achieve the lowest prices
for the benefit of improving consumer welfare and the competitiveness of the
economy; to regulate the industry in order to maintain security and reliability of
snpply.
Various structures were considered and rejected as either being unlikely to
meet these objectives or impractical because of the nature of the NI electricity
market. The review included: maintaining vertical integration; creating two
vertically integrated structures, as in Scotland; establishing a single generating
company and a single transmission, distribution and supply company; and, NIE
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retaining a major power station with the other stations being owned by independent
generators. In the event, the structure chosen as most appropriate for achieving the
stated objectives involved separating the generating sector from the rest of the
industry, the latter to remain as a single company. Subsequently, NIE’s assets were
transferred to the private sector through a combination of a trade sale mad a public
flotation, unlike the industD, in GB. During the first stage in April/May 1992, the
four power stations were sold by competitive tender, while NIE’s remaining assets
were reconstituted as a "new" NIE plc (NIE) and floated publicly in June 1993 by
means of a fixed price offer.
The organisation of the industr3, is illustrated in Figure 3.2, the main features
of which are as follows:
(i) NIE’s principal ’role is essentially the deliver3, and sale of electricitT. For
this purpose: it is divided into a number of core businesses: Power Procurement
(PPB) purchases bulk electricity from the generating companies which it re-sells to
suppliers at a bulk supply tariff (BST). It is also responsible for the scheduling
and despatch of generating sets to ensure security and quali~, of supply;
Operations (T/D) owns and maintains the transmission and distribution network
for deliver3, to customers; and, Supply retails electricity to customers. For these
roles, NIE holds the sole, combined Transmission and Public Electricity Supply
(PES) licence (DED, 1992b). These businesses are "ring fenced" to prohibit
cross-subsidy and each is regulated separately (see Section 5).
(ii) In the generating sector, the power stations operate under independent
o~aership and a Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation has been introduced to encourage new
entrants in renewable generation. The PPB purchases electricity, under contract
from the generating companies which produce when it instructs: NIE is not
permitted to own any generating capacity within its authorised area.
(iii) Retail supply has been opened fully to competition. Other companies can
become second-tier suppliers (STS) to compete with NIE Supply for customers. In
addition, industrial and commercial consumers with a monthly average demand of
I MW and over may contract directly for the purchase of electricity with the PPB
by becoming an exempt self-supplier.
(iv) The principal commercial feature is the Supply Competition Code. This
stipulates that the total output of the power stations, with certain limited
exceptions, must be bought and sold through the PPB. As Table 3.1 shows, bulk
electricity is purchased under a set of long term, power purchasing and generating
unit agreements (PPAs). The variation in duration of these contracts reflects the
expected economic lifetimes of the generating sets, ranging from late 1997 to
2024. However, the Regulator can cancel a PPA earlier, from late 1996 to 2010,
to promote competition in generation and supply (see the next section).
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(v) The industry is overseen by the Director General of Electricity Supply for
Northern Ireland (the Regulator) and the DED, principally under the Electricity
(Northern Ireland) Order 1992 (DED, 1992c). The Regulator is assisted in his
duties by the Office of Electricity Regulation for Northern Ireland (Offer NI). The
regulatoR, regime’s functions cover three main responsibilities: granting the three
types of licence, i.e., Generating, Transmission and PES, and STS; promoting an
efficient and competitive industu,, where possible; and, price regulation for
consumer protection. To assist with the latter task, the Regnlator has appointed a
Northern Ireland Consumer Committee for Electricity. Finally, the Regulator can
rcfer any matter relating to the activities of operators in the electricity market to
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on public interest grounds.
This structure reflects a number of the features of the electricity industu, in
GB but with some significant differences (Department of Energy, 1988; Industry
Department for Scotland, 1988). First, the division of generation into a number of
independent companies and its separation from transmission and distribution is
similar to the structure adopted in England and Wales but the change in ownership
was more radical in NI. Whereas the fossil generating assets of the Central
Electricity, Generating Board (CEGB) were transferred to an effective duopoly,
National Power and PowerGen, the much smaller NI generating capacity had a
greater degree of fragmentation.5 In contrast, the small scale of the two Scottish
electricity companies meant that each was privatised within an existing vertically
integrated structure, although with some redistribution of power stations to give a
similar type of plant mix.6 The Scottish two-compan_v structure was deemed to
have the benefit of "yardstick" competition.
Retail competition has been fully, possible in NI from the outset, unlike the
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) in England and Wales which had a mainly
franchise market in their respective supply areas (competition beiug introduced
progressively with the franchise abolished by 1998). However, the remainder of
the NI electricity industry is more monopolistic as a result of the Supply,
Competition Code which has allowed the PPB to operate as a legal monopsonist
and monopolist in the purchase and sale of wholesale electricity respectively. At
the outset, the technical arrangements involved in establishing a competitive
wholesale electricity trading system, a Pool, were considered to be impractical in
the small NI system and contrary to consumers’ interests on the grounds that the
cost of setting up this mechanism would be excessive in relation to total unit sales,
and thus likely to lead to higher prices. However, an important feature of the
-~ +ll~e CEGI3’s nuclear and hydro-electric pumped storage capacity was assigned to Nuclear
Electric and the National Grid Company respectively.
As in England and Wales, nucle~lr generatiort was assigned to a separate publicly owned
comp~my, Scouish Nuclc~lr.
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Figure 3.3: Proposed Northern Ireland Pool
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regulatou, regime is early cancellation of the PPAs, provided that the Regulator is
convinced that a Pool is feasible in Northern Ireland and can be made to operate in
a way which will bring benefits to customers. As Table 3.1 shows, the exclusive
monopoly given to the PPB in the wholesale generation market could change after
1996 to permit the creation of a Pool. The next section discusses this possibility in
the NI context.
3.4. Promoting Competition
Economic theoD’ approaches electricity privatisation from the perspective of
improving economic efficiency on the basis of two main principles: (i) productive
efficiency which requires that electricity is produced at least cost; (ii) allocative
efficiency whereby prices reflect accurately the costs of resources used. In theory,
and in the absence of market failures, these conditions will be achieved when
competition characterises those activities considered feasible for this purpose.
Generation (producing or importing electricity) is considered to be a
competitive activity for two reasons. First, the incentive of merit order giving
economic precedence to those power stations producing the cheapest electricity
should induce generating companies to compete with each other by keeping their
costs as low as possible in order to maximisc utilisation. In tttru, this will lead to
efficiency gains with demand being met at minimum cost and resulting tariffs more
closely aligned to costs. Second, the threat of competition from new entrants using
the most modern technologies should similarly restrain prices. As a consequence of
such competitive pressures, generation is deemed to require relatively little
regulation.
In contrast, central despatch and the T/D (or wires) business are presumed to
be natural monopolies for which there is no convincing economic argument for
replicating an existing set-up. Costs will be minimised and productive efficiency
achieved if these activities remain as monopolies, provided that there is
non-discriminatory third party access (TPA) to the grid network for suppliers
paying price-regulated use of system (UoS) and connection charges. This will
facilitate the development of competition between suppliers. In summary,
therefore, privatisation allows the potential for promoting competition as far as
practical in the generation and supply of electricity, while price regulation ensures
against possible exploitation of monopoly power or where the scope for
introducing competition is restricted and will need time to emerge. Regulation can
be more or less intrnsive depending on the degree of competition existing in the
industry.
The reality is, however, that the current structure leaves significant constraints
on competition, although these are anticipated as existing only during the initial
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stages of the privatisation development programme~7 In the first instance, as Table
3.1 shows, generation is contractually based. In combination ’with a largely stable
merit order.due to a small number of power stations with known costs and
efficiences, there is no competition between the generating companies.
Furthermore, the Supply Competition Code gives the PPB a statuto~, monopoly
for the purchase and sale of wholesale electricity. Although there is no customer
franchise market and a number of RECs hold licences as STS, ve~, little
competition has developed on the retail side. With inputs having to be bought from
NIE and a small value added in relation to the final price of electricity, there are
limited opportunities to offer altemative contracts. Finally, there is an absence of
exempt suppliers as no undertaking has taken up this option yet.
Changing this monopolistic structure by increasing the scope for competition
will depend on two major planned developments. First, a Pool is planned when the
first PPAs can be cancelled by the Regulator in late 1996 (Offer NI, 1994a). It
will be based broadly on the pricing and settlement arrangements in the British
Pool, but adapted to the existing NI framework (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994). As
Figure 3.3 shows, it will involve the PPB bidding in its existing capacity contracts
with a limited amount of independent generation available initially from cancelled
contracts to permit competition. Accordingly, 120MW at the old, coal-fired
Belfast West plant would be available to compete in a wholesale trading market
from 1996, subject to the costs of improvements to meet emission control
requirements. (In 1992, this plant delivered 10 per cent of all units required.) As
Table 3.1 shows, progressive cancellation of contracts, if and when conditions
change, would allow more competition between generators and suppliers to be
phased in gradually. Ultimately, the earliest date when the market could be fully
opened to competition would be 2010 when the contracts with the two most.
modem power stations at Kilroot and Ballylumford become cancellable.
This proposal has attracted considerable criticism about its abiliu, to have an
effective impact on competition for a considerable time because of the long
transitional period, well into the next centuu,, during which most generation would
remain under contract (Offer NI, 1993). Also, the small size of the NI market and
the limited number of independent bidders has raised concern about the danger of
generator oligopoly power and, thus, a NI Pool’s viability under competition.8 As a
result, it is difficult to predict how much competitive pressure may emerge within
this new mechanism.
For a more detailed analysis, .see McGumaghan (1994).
On the basis of evidence from the British Pool, it hns I~-cn argued that two dominant
generators was not an ~tdeqtmte nmnber for effective competition (Green and Newbcu,,
1992):
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Table 3.2: Availabilio; Levels
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Genetraing Station Historic ,’lverages to Achieved by Genetrtting Compcmies
1990-1991 1992-93 1993-94
% % %
Kilroot 71.6 95.9 94.2
(2 Years)
13allylum ford 73.2 78. I 83.7
(5 Years)
Belfast West 79,9 92.8 99.6
(4 years)
Coolkcera~l 73.9 97.6 99.9
(5 years)
Notes: (I) Ballyhunford bus been tmdergoing "Plant Life Extension" progranune since 1991-92
which has necessitated long Feriods of non availt~bility. On completion of the
programme in 1994, availability is expected to ri.’;e.
(2) The contracts with Coolkeeragh require only four out of its five generating units to be
~lvailable. When the first unit’s contract is cancelled in 1998, nv~filability is expected
to fall.
Source: Northern Ireland Audit Office.
A further opportunity for introducing competition is expected with the
additional generating capaciu, required, initially in 1998 and again early in the
next century, in line with forecast demand and the scheduled retirement dates of
the Belfast West and Coolkeeragh stations (accounting for about 25 per cent of
existing capacity). However, the first deficit will be met by the additional 240MW
of capacity from the anticipated Scottish interconnector, with new potential
entrants competing to provide the remainder.9 While the Scottish link has strategic
importance for generation planning by increasing system reliability and fuel
diversification, it would postpone the competitive process until the second tranche
of investment was needed.
Also, the arrangements for the Scottish interconnector mean that NIE will be a
monopoly purchaser of electricity, at prices linked to the British Pool price, for a
15 year period. In the context of competition, this would restrict TPA until the
year 2013. Furthermore, plant modernisation and high levels of availability could
provide enough capacity to delay the introduction of more competitive pressure
until further into the next centu~,. As Table 3.2 shows, there is already evidence to
suggest that the latter has been achieved since privatisation. Beneficially, bowever,
There may also be ml increase in c~qmcity from non-fossil filcl generation mad the NIE-ESI3
intcrconnector (see Section 6).
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the consequence would be to restrain future upward pressure on tariffs, as the cost
of introducing new generating capacity is a major determinant of electricity prices.
In conclusion, it may take a considerable period of time to establish
competition to any significant extent. Currently, this means that NIE enjoys a
significant degree of market dominance. To prevent any possible exploitation of
fllis position, its core businesses are subject to price regulation. Following a brief
review of GB and NI tariff movements over recent ),ears, the relevant price
controls arc analy,sed in the following section.
3.5. Regulatory Framework
(a) Price Trends
Electricity prices to all categories of customers in NI have historically been
among the most expensive compared with other regions. As discussed in Section 2
above, this is because the provision of electricity has involved inherently.higher
costs with respect to: relying on oil for the main feedstock supplies; small sy,stem
size ,and dispersed population with resulting lower economies of scale; and, the
lack of any established interconnection with the greater reserve margin which has
to be carried. To mitigate the impact of a large increase in world oil prices, a tariff
strategy was adopted in 1981 under which NIE was paid a subsidy to keep its
electricity prices in line with the highest prevailing in England and Wales. This
tariff link ended in 1990 with electricity privatisation in GB, although
subsidisation was not needed after 1986 because of prevailing low oil prices.
Between 1990 and vesting in 1992, electricity prices were set by agreement
between NIE and the Government (following consultation with the General
Consumer Council for Nil°), restricting tariffs within the rate of inflation. Since
privatisation, tariffs have been subject to regulation.
For customers as a whole, electricity pricing arrangements may be considered
under two broad categories: a tariff which NIE must offer to almost all customers
with a maximunl demand less than IMW; those with a nm.xinqum demand
exceeding I MW must take electriciw under contract. In relation to the former,
Table 3.3 examines movements in comparative prices charged to typical Standard
Domestic Tariff customers since April 1989. Over this six ),ear period, NIE’s tariff
increased by 23.4 per cent, just less than the rate of inflation, most of which took
place between 1989/90 and 1992/93, which was a period of relatively high
inflation. Overall, its tariff moved from the lower end of the higher range in
1990/91 to become the most expensive in the UK by April 1993. Despite a 1.5 per
to The statutory duties of this orgtmisation in relation to electricity matters were transferred to
file Northern Ireland Constm~er Colmnittee for Electricity at Offer NI.
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Table.~..~." "" United Kingdom ?briffs, 1989/90 to 1994/95 (p/kWh)
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89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95    htcrease %
89/90 - 94/95
Eastern 6.84 7.46 8.27 8.52 7.92 8.52 24.6
East Midlands 7.05 7.r-~ 8.5 8.8 8.47 8.47 20. I
London 7.32 8.02 8.94 8.99 8.57 8.56 16.9
Manweb 7.66 8.31 9.19 9.36 8.97 9.18 19.8
Midlands 7.19 7.82 8.67 8.76 8.11 8.25 14.7
Northern 7.26 8.09 9.04 9.29 8.71 9.01 24. I
Nor, rob 7.08 7.68 8.53 8.6 8.44 7.91 11.7
Sccboard 7.16 7.81 8.66 8.81 8.52 8.28 15.6
Southcnl 7.06 7.69 8.55 8.74 8.4 8.52 20.7
SWALEC 7.55 8.52 9.42 9.54 9.44 9.44 25.0
SWEI3 7.57 8.39 9.27 9.58 9.17 9.33 23.2
Yorkshire 7.32 7.92 8.65 8.79 8.45 8.45 15.4
England/Wales Average 7.26 7.95 8.81 8.98 8.6 8.66 19.3
Scottish-Power 6.74 7.31 7.97 7.98 8.36 8.22 22.0
Scoltish-Hydro 6.73 7.33 7.98 8.37 8.21 7.87 16.9
GB uvcragc 7.19 7.86 8.69 8.87 8.56 8.57 19.3
NIE 7.65 8.27 9 9.36 9.59 9.44 23.4
RPIJan 1987=100 114.3 125.1 133.1 138.8 140.6 144.2 26.2
ESI3 7.81
Notes:(I) The zlbovc figures arc based on published St~lnd~lrd Domcstic Tariff Schedules at 1
April each year, comprising a fixed quarterly stmlding charge and a unit charge. They
are exclusive of VAT and assume a typical annttal consumption of 3,300kWh. Other
tariffs titan those showll may be offered to customers and some I~.EC’s offer discounts
Ibr different pa)’ment methods
(2)The figures inchldc ~dl rebutes and changes to tariffs mmounccd in 1992/93 and
1993/1994. The 1994/95 prices account Ibr the 8 pounds per customer rebate
omlotmced by Seeboard from April 1994 and the 2 per cent and 3.7 per cent discotml
on unit rates in 1994 by Scottish-Power and Scottish-Hydro respectively.
(3) ESI3 figure has bbeen adjusted Ibr exchange roles.
Source: Oflbr N!; Centre for the study of Regulated Industries.
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cent tariff reduction subsequently, the present (1994/95) differential is 9 per cent
above the GB average and NI remains the highest priced region (together with
SWALEC).
In the case of large users of electricity, a similar analysis is limited by contract
prices and commercally confidential information (Offer NI, 1994b). Prior to
privatisation, it was acknowledged that large users were paying prices some 20 per
cent higher than their counterparts in GI3 (House of Commons, 1991). Since then,
NIE has moved towards more cost reflective pricing which resulted in quite
significant increases in electricity charges to this categor’y, although transitional
relief has been given to phase in the full impact. While the actual size of the price
differential bep, veen large users in NI and GB has been a matter of debate, the
Regulator estimated it to have been in the order of 5- I fl per cent on average during
1993/94, although there was a wide range of variation (Offer NI, 1995).11
(b) Price Controls
Electricity tariffs and contracts in NI are based on a set of three inter-related
price control formulae. These cover each of the components determini.ng the final
price of electr city - the BST, UoS and supply charges - which account for
approximately 60,~2 33 and 7 per cent respectively. Figure 3.4 summarises the
equations specifing NIE’s allowed tariff increases which are contained in its
composite Transmission and PES licence. The price controls are aimed at
replicating a competitive market, thus avoiding a possible abuse of market power.
As the BST will need to be changed with the establishment of the Pool, the
Regulator can formally revise the price controls after March 1997.
The equations are broadly similar to the regulatou’ regime which protects
eleetricity customers elsewhere in the UK. In this respect, the factors included
relate to changes in the rate of inflation and efficiency savings which can
reasonably be expected to be achieved and passed on to consumers (Centre for the
Study of Regulated Industries, 1992). However, there is a unique point of
difference in the NI framework where the purpose is to regulate NIE’s total
revenue, and thus its profits, by providing an incentive to control its costs. The
following subdivisions provide an account of how the price controls apply to
NIE.13
Comlmrisons depended on rebates tnldcr the N] load managemenl ~heme, the fuel cost
udjusUnent mechanism and the transitional relief schemes.
~" For certain large u~rs, this could represent 70-80 per cent.
t3 For a further analysis, st..-e 13remmn ( 1994 ).
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Figure 3.4: Electricity Price Regulation in Northern Ireland
(a) Bulk Supply Tariff
M~ = (l-r) At+ rB, + C, + D, + 1
~
Where:
Mt~= the maximum average charge per trait sold
r=0.1
A -- actual purchase costs Ix:r unit sold
13 = reference yardstick of fuel costs per unit sold
C = power precuremcnt administration
D -- power procurement excluded costs ix:r unit sold
K= a correction factor per unit sold for under or over charging in the prcvioas year (applies to
all the formulae).
Maximum average charge per unit sold (p/kWh)
90% of electricity
purchase coots paid to
generators in current
year (£m) / Volumes
(kWh)
Allowable direct coots
(pfKWk)" RPI
10% of notified preference
purchase costs (p/kWh) "
Formula weighted 55% to RPI,
15% to Coal index, 15% to Gas
index, 15% to Oil index
(b) Use of S)~stem Chal;ge
M,~ = hF, + (I-h)V,Q,-Tt+ I~
~lerc:
bdD = the maximum allowable revenue
I1= 075
F" = a fixed COill]~ncnt
VQ = a variable component relating to the vohlnlc of units carricd
T = ml adjustmctfl lbr electricity losses in the iletwork
Maximum allowable revenue
(£m)
75% of previous year’s fixed
revenue (£m)° RPI + 3.5%
25% of previous year’s maximum average
charge. (p/kWh)* RPI + 1%" Volumes (kWh)
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Figure 3.4 / continued
(c) &lpply Charge
M~= G,+ Ul+ S,+ KI
Where:
Ms = the maximum average charge per unit supplied
G = the electricity purchase costs from power procurement ix~r unit supplied
U = the allowed ixtyment for use of system ix:r trait supplied
S = the direct cost per trait of supplying customers
Maximum allowable price (p/kWh)
Component representing
direct supply marketing and
administration costs (p/kWh)
¯ RPI
Electdcity purchase
costs (regulated
separately, p/kWh)
Source: Department of Economic Dcvelopmem (1992b).
Transmission and distribution costs
(regulated separately, p/kWh)
BST:
The BST equation restricts the amount of the costs incurred by the PPB in
purchasing wholesale electricity which can be passed through and, hence, the price
at which bulk electricity is re-sold to suppliers. The vast majority of these power
purchase costs are contracted payments made to the generating companies under
the PPAs for availability in the year ahead and to cover the fuel costs of producing
electrici~,, together with other contracted services)4 As the prices at which the
generators sell power to the PPB are pre-determincd under the conditions of sale of
the power stations as part of the privatisation process, they are effectively outside
the remit of the Regulator and thus not subject to regulator3’ control, provided that
the generators adhere to the conditions set out in the PPAs. Nothwithstanding, the
PPB is required to purchase as economically as possible to achieve the least cost
of generation.
The availability payment is compensation for keeping the power stations or individtml
generating sets ready for immediate use and also covers the provision of spinning reserve
plus a profit element lbr the generators. "lqle energy payment is calculated with reference to
indices of prevailiog world prices for oil mid coal mtd the US cxchm~ge rate and is subject to
raonthly adjusunent.
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For this purpose, a maximum average charge per unit of bulk electricity sold
(ML~) is set in each year with NIE given a financial incentive by means of an "r"
coefficient to purchase generation economically, within the constraints of the P PAs
and the standards of supply which it must maintain.15 Set originally at a value of
0. I, "r" permits 90 per cent of actual unit purchase costs (At) to be a full-cost pass
through, but ties the remainder to 10 per cent of a unit level of reference purchase
costs (Bt). This latter amount, which is allowed to be passed on, is derived by a
composite index proxying movements in the price of three fuels - heavy fuel oil,16
gas ,and coal - together with the RPI, all against a base year notifed value,
determined by DED under advice from its consultants. While no information is
available on the nature of indexation chosen, it may have been assumed that the
general price index and international fuel indices would move in line with
electricity prices over time. It may be thought also that the equal weighting given
to each of the fuels reflected some optimal generating plant mix.
If the PPB can reduce its actual purchase costs and outperform this yardstick
mechanism so that rA~ is less than rB,, it may keep the profit.~7 The rest of the
variables in the formula include the PPB’s operating costs (Ct) which are passed
through in line with the rate of inflation together with excluded costs (DO which
are classified as being outside its control and, therefore, are permitted to be passed
on in full.j8 Based on forecast maximum permissible revenue, there is a correction
factor (K,) which adjusts the unit price for any divergence resulting from under- or
over-charging in the previous year (included in all three equations).
UoS:
The UoS charge is for the deliveu, of electricity through the transmission mad
distribution network. Although this element accounts for around one-third of the
final price of electricity, the wires business is the most important commercial part
of NIE’s overall activities because it provides the overwhelming majority of its
operating profits. This price control is different to that imposed on either the RECs
These arc the generation security phmning standard (relating to capacity) m~d the operating
security standard (relating to spinning reserve) which act as a counterweight to "r".
"l]~c HFO variable is related to both high (3%) and low (1%) sulphur oil. The fonmda directs
more of the higher cost (1%) filel to be used tip to 1995/96 in recognition of the need to
comply with progressively inore stringent emission levels. Thereafter, the constraint is
relaxed.
However, fire level of profit/loss on the 13 tenn is capped each year at +/- £4 millions in
1992/93 prices, incretlsed mmually at thc RP[.
Exclnded power purchase costs arc predominmltly related to the Land 13ank and need the
l~.egulator’s approval.
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in England and Wales or the two Scottish electriciD, companies where there is a
price cap which imposes a maximum average revenue per unit transmitted and
distributed. In contrast to GB, the control on NIE is designed as a combination of
elements of a revenue cap19 and a price cap. This "cap and collar" method means
that the T/D income is less sensitive to the number of units delivered across the
network.
As Figure 3.4 shows, the maximum allowable revenue each year (ME0 is
determined by a fixed element (Ft)2° which accounts for 75 per cent of the total
with a variable element (V,Q,) contributing the remaining 25 per cent. The former
permits the previous year’s fixed income to grow in real terms by 3.5 per cent
annually, i.e., regardless of the total number of units actually transported across
the network: this constitutes the revenue cap effect. The remainder of permitted
revenue is determined by allowing the UoS unit charge to increase in real terms by
I per cent annually multiplied by the number of units carried, i.e., quantity related:
this is the price cap effect. The choice of the RPI factors in F and V were set at the
outset to reflect the expected rate of growth of electricity sales over the five year
period to the next regulator3_’ review. In the event of the actual growth rate being
greater than forecast leading to the maximum allowable revenue limit being
exceeded, and vice versa, NIE wotdd have to readjust the following year’s tariffs,
bearing in mind the size of ant’ over- or under-recovery. The equation also
contains an adjustment factor (Tt) giving NIE an incentive to reduce transmission
losses. Any savings on a target level may be added to the maximum revenue and
retained.2)
Effectively, therefore, the greater part of permissible T/D revenue is
independent of volume growth which prevents this major source of NIE’s total
profits from being highly sensitive to units sold. Given that the control is not due
to be reviewed formally until 1997, it provides NIE with a secure and stable
income and a degree of regulatoD, protection in its essential business. Presumably,
permitting a significmat real increase in annual revenue recognises the need to
upgrade the network in coming years with the resulting capital costs involved.
Furthermore, to the extent that it removes an incentive to push sales by setting a
maximum limit on total allowable revenue, it may be presumed to be a mechanism
by which the DED attempted to promote the efficient use of electricity.
~9 This is the ustml practice in US utility regulation.
This was set originally in 1992/93 at £129.63 millions.
¯ .iThe allowed rate of electrical losses is ~t at 10.5 per cent of units transmitted, as a result of
which NIE increased Mt~ by £917,690 due to savings made in 1993/94.
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Supply charge:
Strictly speaking, tile supply control equation covers the total price of
electricity retailed to fnal users by setting a maximum average tariff per unit sold
(Msa). Accordingly, its role is essentially a passing through of the already regulated
costs of upstrcanl activities= i.e., generation purchase (Gt) and transmission and
distribution fU~) costs. In addition, it detemlines the revenue allowed to cover the
cost of NIE Supply’s activities (St) and, hence, the supply charge to cover mainly
billing and metering of customers aJld administrative costs. The control ensures
that this charge does not change by more than the rate of inflation. Given the
diversity of the retail market, the allowed component price further reflects the
different categories of customer between those with a maximum demand of under
I MW and larger users.
3.6. North-,Sbuth lnterconnection
There are a number of capacity and trading benefits to a sumll, isolated system
which can be achieved through interconnection with an adjacent utility (Scott and
McGurnaghan, 1981). With respect to both NIE and ESB, it would contribute to
ending their energy isolation and take advantage of economies of scale and
increased reliability of supply. Furthem~ore, access to other grid networks and
enlarged markets is in line with the wider objective of developing and reinforcing
trans-European energy networks, particularly linking peripheral regions with more
central areas of the EU.
Originally, the interconnector agreement was between two vertically integrated
nationalised systems: each charactcrised by centrally plalmed investment and
statutou, monopoly power over its respective customer base. During the short time
it operated, the link worked on the principle of equal benefits, realised mainly in
the form of providing mutual reserve capacity betaveen both systems. In the
intervening period, however, the market framework has changed so that
re-iastatement will occur within significantly different circumstances. Whereas
ESB has continued to function as a public sector, vertically integrated monopoly,
NIE has been privatised and its activities must be conducted essentially on a
market-orientated basis. In this context, NIE’s licence requires it to have regard to
economic purchasing and stipulates that transactions must be "at the best effective
price reasonably obtainable having regard to the resources available". In the light
of this condition, its policy towards any future trading relationship should be to
attempt to maximise its share of profit from the interconneetor, a potentially
conflicting rationale to the previous concept of equal sharing of benefits.
Nevertheless, the basis for restoring the interconnector is the premise that it
will be mutually beneficial. In the short run, interconnection is estimated to realise
savings, as previously, in the form of improved overall reliability of each system
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by providing mutual support during temporary shortfalls on either system together
with trading benefits. However, the actual level of possible benefits would be small
since the capacity of the present interconnector sets a limit to the amount of
reserve capacity which would be rendered dispensible and, hence, total plant
savings. With a turnover of around £480 millions in 1994, it is estimated that short
run savings for NIE could anlount to approximately £1.5 millions per annum, £1
million from a reduction in spinning reserve required and the remainder from the
possibility of trading on the margin. Similar forms of benefits should accrue to
ESB.
In the longer term, the potential economic benefits could be more substantial.
If the intercormector became well-established, it could open up the possibility of an
increased trading relationship and enlarged transfer capability with the prospect of
a more integrated electricity sector evolving. Co-operation in terms of planning
future generating capacity would realise significant economic benefits to
customers in both areas from cost savings both of a capital nature and from
economies of scale. For example, total generation capacity in a more combined
system need be less while the installation of a more economic set size is made
possible. Furthermore, should insufficient capacity be available in the ROI to meet
increasing demancl, the necessary plant could be available in NI to meet this need.
For that purpose, the NI Pool is intended to provide an incentive to provide
additional capacity when a high enough price prevails. Ultimately, there is the
potential for demand to be matched with supply, regardless of ownership.
However, greater integration of both electrici~, markets has to be viewed with
caution because it is difficult to predict the respective paths the systems may take,
and so the nature of an), future market framework. Accordingly, longer-term
benefits will depend on several important factors, which remain uncertain
presently. These are as follows:
First, in theory, competitive pricing of exports and imports in a Pool system
should give nn overall efficiency gain, in the sense of creating a greater economic
surplus. The distribution of this welfare impact will, howevefi be different between
producers and consumers in both areas. Should ESB remain as the monoposony
buyer of power and thus the only pool participant from the ROI with whom trade
was possible while the major part of generation in NI was contracted to NIE, as at
present, and it continued to dominate both sides of the Pool, the scope for
competitive pricing, and thus increased trading opportunities, would be lessened.
Second, both areas are subject to different emission reduction targets. In the
case of NI, this applies in an increasingly stringent manner while, in contrast, the
ROI would not appear to be as constrained (Weyman-Jones, 1994). Consequently,
the respective pollution control targets would need a mechanism to fit into a more
integrated supply system, possibly involving the trading of emission entitlements.
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Given current practice in NI, however, it is difficult to envisage that tile authorities
responsible for implementing environmental legislation would be receptive to a
quota-switching arrangement which might result in breaching aggregate limits.
Third, assuming the Scottish interconncctor is commissioned in 1998, it would
be complemental, to the cross-border link. From the ROI’s viewpoint, it could be
presumed that it would be advantageous to gain access to the GB pool via NI. This
might not be possible, however, as NIE has 15 year rights. Given the concern
about expected upward pressure oil tariffs, it might be assumed that NIE would be
influenced by economic circumstance to retain the benefit of cheaper GB Pool
electricity, when available, mainly for NI customers.
Finally and most critically, basing capacity planning strategy in any
irrevocable manner on the integrity of the link could be risky were it to result in
one system becoming substantially more dependent on tile other. Unless there is
certain confidence surrounding the securiU, situation in the longer ternl, that area
without sufficient independent generating capacity might face a major energy crisis
at a later date.
In summao,, cross-border co-operation in the supply of electricity has been
experienced and, while operational, was reasonably successful. Further
development with a view to achieving a more combined system could realise
potential, longer ternl benefits. Given the difficulties in forecasting the many
relevant economic and political variables, however, these remain extremely
uncertain and make it difficult to draw firnl conclusions about the prospects for
any significant integration of the electricity markets between both jurisdictions.
Accordingly, qnantification awaits future clarification.
3. Z Conchlsion
This paper has coasidercd file experience of electricity privatisation in the
particular circumstances of NI. Privatisation was undertaken in the Government’s
belief that similar benefits to those achieved in GB would come to consumers in
NI. In the short period to date, privatisation has not resulted in its main objective
of achieving competition. That possibility is anticipated at a future time.
However, serious reservations must exist concerning the ability of future
planned developments to have an effective impact on the situation for some
considerable time. From the point of view of improving consumer welfare as a
whole, tilt benefits of electricity privatisation will depend ultimately on
demonstrably lower prices whether through increased competition or regulation.
As the quotation at the beginning indicates, however, it may not be possible to
meet eveR,body’s expectations of what competition may deliver.
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Appendix1 Maximum Perm~311d En~J;sicn Levels for Po~r Stations In Northern
Ireland in ACCOrdance "v~th the United Kingdom plan Dated 20 December 1~O
r~ Reducing Emissions from large Combustloo Pbnts.
(a) SULPHUR DIOXIDE (TONNES) {b) OXIDES OF NITROGEN (TONNES)
55
Year Coolkeeragh K]lroot Ballylumlord Bellast West Nort~m beland
Total
1993 (a) 2580 21G~O 5t400 5020 80000
(b) 52O 8650 743O 34OO 2~000
1994 (a) 6200 t4000 44600 10200 75000
(b) 700 7100 "7100 51(~O 20O00
1995 (a) 7000 14000 37800 1(3~00 6~X~O
(b) 700 7100 7100 5100 20000
1996 (a) 1700 13600 386(X) t0200 64000
(b) 700 71(O 7100 51(:O 2OO0O
t997 (a) 2900 13500 341(:O 7500 580G0
(b) 700 7600 7700 4000 20000
1998 (a) 5600 136~ 31300 2500 53000
(b) 700 8400 8400 2500
1999 (a) 5900 13300 29800 Nil 49000
2000 (a) 21(X) 13000 39000 Nil 46000
2001 (a) 1500 12600 27~0 Nil 42~X)
2C02 (a) 9(]0 12~O 25200 Nil 39000
20G3 (a) 500 12400 22100 Nil 35C~
Source: Department or tit= Envirmtment for North~n Ire;and (1S~4).
Chapter 4
COMPE’I7770N IN THE BRITISH EI2ZCTRICITT INDUSTRY
Richard Green, Office of Electricity Regulation
The changes to the British electricity indust~, have rightly attracted a lot of
attention, l am presently working at the Office of Electricity Regulation, which
has the task of overseeing the electricity indust~, in England and Wales and in
Scotland. There is a separate Office of Electrici~, Regulation for Northern
Ireland, which is responsible for developments in that province. Since Northern
Ireland is the subject of another paper at this conference, I will not refer to it. The
bulk of the paper will be concerned with what has happened in England and
Wales, but I will also have a few comments about Scotland, where the indust~,
has a different structure.
When discussing the electricity indust~,, it is helpfiJl to break it down into
stages, starting with generation. In England and Wales, coal-fired stations
accounted for 80 per cent of the electrici~, generated in the late 1980s - most of
the rest came from nuclear power. Over the last few years, nuclear has increased
its share to about one quarter, and the share of coal-fired electricity has shrunk to
just over Ilalf, ,as new gas-fired stations have been commissioned. More gas-fired
capacity is under construction, and so its share, presently about one-seventh, is
due to rise further. About one-tenth of the electricity used in England and Wales is
imported from France and Scotland.
The next stage in the indust~, is high-voltage transmission, moving electricity
from the power station to local distribution networks. The third stage,
distribution, takes the power to consumers at lower voltages. Until a few years
ago, I would have stopped there, because the distributor was also the company
which dealt with the consumer. Since 1990~ however, selling electricity to
end-users has become a fourth distinct stage of the indust~,, known as supply.
The supplier has to agree terms with the consumer, collect payment for the
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electrici~,, and then use the money, to pay for generating, transmitting, and
distributing it.
For a domestic consumer, generation accounts for about half of the total bill,
transmission one-twentieth, and distribution about a quarter. The supplier’s own
costs are also a relatively small proportion of the bill. Finally~ the fossil fuel le~,,
presently 10 per cent, is added to the bill. Most of the levy is used to cover
nuclear liabilities, for fuel reprocessing and station decommissioning, which had
been incurred, but not provided for, before vesting day. The remainder is used to
support renewable generation - wind power, waste burning, and so on.
Veu, large consumers pay much less (in proportion) for distribution, since
they wpically take their electricity at higher voltages, causing fewer costs.
Accordingly, generation charges make up more than two-thirds of the typical bill.
Since many of the supplier’s costs are fixed, regardless of the number of units
taken, the snpplier’s charges will only be a tiny proportion of the total bill.
In most cases, the supplier is the distributor who owns the wires which deliver
the electricity, but the distributor has to allow other companies to use its wires if
the), wish to supply consumers in its area. You do not need to own a distribution
system to become an electrici~, supplier - all you really need is an office, a
healthy credit rating, and a supply licence, issued by Offer. With a few
small-scale exemptions, everyone involved in the electricity industu, has to have a
licence, and the licences contain provisions to allow Offer to cart3, out its legal
duties. There are quite a few of these, but they can be summarised as protecting
consumers and promoting competition.
Often, our role is protecting consumers through promoting competition. The
new industry structure~ which was announced in 1988 and implemented on March
31 1990 - Vesting Day - introduced competition to the industry wherever it would
be practicable. The Central Electricity Generating Board (GEGB) was split into
four parts, and three new generating companies started to compete with each other~
and with the pumped storage stations owned by the fourth.part, the National Grid
Compan),. Entry into generation has also been liberalised~ and a dozen major
stations, and many small ones, have come into the industry.
Competition in supply is being introduced in stages. At first, only the 5,000
largest consumers, with maximum demands of more than 1 MW~ were allowed to
choose their supplier. They consume about 30 per cent of the electricity supplied
in England and Wales. Since April 1994, another 45,000 customers with a
maximum demand of more than 100 kW have joined the competitive market,
which now covers half the electricity supplied. In April 1998, every consumer
should have the right to choose their own supplier - people are already working to
make sure that this will happen.
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Transnlission and distribution are natural monopolies. A single company -
the National Grid Company - is rcsponsibl¢ for transmission across thc whole of
England and Wales, while there are twelve regional electricity companies (RECs),
each of which is responsible for distribution in part of the country. It would be
senseless to create a second network of wires, and since competition is impossible,
regulation is needed to ensure that consumers are protected. Offer also regulates
tile overall tariffs paid by small consumers, since these consumers cannot choose
their suppliers yet. The price controls allow tile suppliers to pass through the costs
of generation, transmission and distribution, and contain an element for the supply
business’ own costs and profits. Offer does not regulate the overall prices paid by
large coasumers in the competitive market.
The REC is bound to offer its system to all licensed suppliers on the same
terms, and this non-discriminatory access makes competition in supply possible -
if you do oot need to use 3’our own wires to supply a customer, it becomes a
contestable activity.
Similarly, the National Grid Company (NGC) has a lieence obligation to
facilitate competition, and has to offer non-discriminatory access to its system to
all potential generators. That does not mean that all generators should pay tile
same prices - it is quite proper that the prices tile), pay should reflect the costs
which they impose on tile system. There is more generation than demand in the
north of England, and more demand than generation in the south. Ira new station
is built in tile south, it will reduce the amount of electricity that has to be imported
from the north, and NGC’s costs shotdd be lower than if the station had been built
further north. NGC’s charges reflect this, so that generators in tile north have to
pay more, and new stations face an incentive to locate in areas which reduce the
grid’s costs. NGC has kept Offer fidly informed about these charges, for it is
important that the regional differentials reflect costs - differentials which were too
high or too low would discriminate against some users.
The cost differentials can be measured in several ways, although they give the
same answer in the long run. In Chile, for example, a very detailed law requires
the industry to calculate the short-nln costs of transmission for ever?, point on tile
network, and to set charges equal to these costs, together with a mark-up (or
mark-down) to easure that tile transmission system earns enough revenue to cover
its overall costs. In England and Wales, NGC calculates medium-run costs for
each region: an approach which gives less detail: but more stability in its charges.
The biggest changes to tile way in which tile industD, is organiscd conccru
generation. In the past, the CEGB drew up an interual merit order, listing its
stations in order of increasing cost, and then ensured that the stations with the
lowest costs were operated most intensively, to minimise the overall cost of
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meeting demand. This internal procedure has been replaced by a market
mechanism - the Pool.
The Pool is not a true "spot market", but a day ahead market, because
generators (and customers) must be given time to plan ahead. The Pool calculates
prices and operating schedules based on the most accurate predictions available,
and has a mechanism for reconciling the differences between the predicted
schedule and the out-turn.
It is the only physical market in electricity. It is impossible to tell which
consumer’s demand is met by the electricity from a particular power station, and
so large-scale bilateral trading would be impossibly complex to monitor. A few
small stations do sell their output bilaterally, but all large stations have to sell their
output to the Pool, and suppliers buy from it. In that way, you only need to
monitor the electricity put on to the system, and the amount taken off, and the
market need not woru, about the pattern of flows on the system.
EveD, day, the Pool receives bids from each large power station, reporting
their availability during the following day, and the minimum prices at which they
are prepared to generate. It then uses this information to calculate the least-cost
operating schedule which will meet the demand predicted for the next day. Much
of the software used was inherited from the CEGB’s merit order system, but bid
prices are now used instead of the C EGB’s cost estimates.
For each half-hour, the Pool can identi~, the most expensive station which is
in normal operation, and the price which it has asked for becomes the system
marginal price, paid for ever3., unit of energy generated according to the Pool’s
day-ahead operating schedule. A system like this, in which your bid affects
whether you run, but will not have much impact on the price you are paid (since
for most of the time that you are called, more expensive stations will be running as
well, and the price is set by their bids) gives small companies the right incentive to
ask for a price which is equal to their avoidable costs. A large company, however,
might ask higher prices for some of its stations, even if they are less likely to run
as a result, because this will push up the prices earned by the company’s other
stations, which continue to run.
Argentina has an electricity pool in which each station’s bids are regulated,
and required to equal its marginal fuel cost. That is one way of easuring that no
company can abuse market power. The approach in England and Wales, however,
has been to make competition work. If the market is competitive enough,
companies will bid at the level of their avoidable costs without any need for
regulation.
The second part of the Pool price is known as the capacity element. In order
to meet the highest demands, we need to have some power stations which only run
for a few hours a 3,ear, and could not cover their fixed costs if they were only paid
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for running at those times. The capaciW element is the product of tile risk of a
power cut, the loss of load probability, and the cost of a power cut, the value of
lost load. It measures the value of additional capacity - the chance that it will be
needed to avoid a power cut, times the costs that will be saved if it does so. If
there is a lot of spare capacity on the system, the capacity payments will be small,
and generators may find it profitable to close some of their less efficient stations,
which are no longer needed. If there is little spare capacity, generators should
expect to earn enough from capacity payments to cover the cost of keeping their
old stations open, keeping the system in balance.
In practice, stations will not generate as predicted a day in advance, for the
level of demand may be different, some stations may become unavailable, and
some may not be able to run at full load because of constraints on the transmission
system All the output which was not predicted in the day-ahead schedule is paid
for at the bid prices of the stations involved, and the total cost of this is added to
tile Pool price in a charge known as uplift. Man), of the costs involved can be
influenced by the way in which the transmission system is operated, and so NGC
presently shares the cost of uplift, to give it a financial incentive to minimise the
cost of the system.
Prices in tile Pool were expected to be volatile, and have been - it is part of
their role, to signal information on the balance between supply and demand.
Contracts for differences can provide financial stability, without masking the price
messages, by committing traders to make side payments based on the Pool price.
When the Pool price is high, the seller (typically a generator) would have to give a
rebate to the buyer (typically a supplier), while if the Pool price is low, the buyer
gives the seller some extra income. The net effect of trading through the Pool ,and
holding a contract is to make the net payments much more predictable, and so far:
most of the trades through the Pool have been backed by contracts. When you
hear that one company has sold electricity to another, what it has actually sold is a
contract for differences. The actual electricity still has to be sold through the Pool,
even though the total payments between the companies no longer depend on the
Pool price. Despite that, because Pool prices are so visible - they are published in
the Financial Times eveR, day- they have received most of the attention.
Figure 4.1 shows monthly average Pool prices since the Pool was set up. For
much of the period, there was an upwards trend, and Offer has held a number of
enquiries into Pool prices. The reports have raised several issues concerned with
the workings of the Pool, and some changes have been implemented as a result.
The overall level of prices has always attracted the most attention, however.
At first, tile avoidable costs of the two major generators were above their
average revenues from the Pool, and on that basis, it was difficult to object to
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Figure 4. I : Average Pool Price by Component
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increases in bid prices from their initial levels. By the middle of 1993, however,
average Pool revenues exceeded the avoidable costs of the two major generators.
Over the longer term, a competitive market price would need to cover the cost
of building new plant or refurbishing old plant, as well as the cost of maintaining
or operating it. This level may well be above the demand weighted Pool price to
date. In contrast, competitive market prices in the short term would reflect more
closely the avoidable costs of producing electricity, and the extent of capacity on
the system in relation to demand. They could, for exanlplc, be as low as to enable
generators to cover only their one year avoidable costs.
Pool prices were above that level at the beginning of 1994, and National
Power and PowerGen agreed to reduce them for the next two years (1994/5 and
1995/6). They undertook to bid into the Pool in such a way that annual average
Pool price would in normal circumstances reasonably be expected not to exceed
2.46 p/kWh time weighted and 2.61 p/kWh demand weighted (in 1994/5 prices).
The Director General obtained these undertakings because experience had
suggested that the extent of competition had not been sufficient to restrain National
Power and PowerGen if they wished to increase prices. The two companies were
given plant accotmting for 78 per cent of prc-vcsting output in England and Wales,
including all the coal- and oil-fired plant. Their overall market shares have since
fallen, to about 60 per cent, following an increase in output from Nuclear Electric,
and entry by new companies which have built combined cycle gas turbine stations.
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More nuclear and gas-fired capacity is due on stream, and so National Power and
PowerGen’s market share can be expected to fall somewhat further.
This new entu, has until recently been almost entirely geared to running
baseload, however. This means that competition to run in the non-baseload section
of the load curve is still limited almost entirely to the two major generators. The
outputs of Nuclear Electric, the independent Combined Cycle Gas Turbines
(CCGTs) and the intcrconnectors are practically constant throughout the day. It is
the plant owned by National Power and PowerGen that accounts for almost all the
variation in output over the day.
The System Marginal Price (SMP), the largest component of Pool price, is
equal to the bid of the marginal plant. Nearly 90 per cent of the time, it is set by a
station owned by National Power or PowerGen. The increased output of Nuclear
Electric and the interconnectors, and the new entu, by independents, have changed
the market shares of baseload output, but have so far had little or no impact on
market shares for the non-baseload part of the load curve.
The increased competition for baseload rtmning may put increased competitive
pressure on plant rumling mid-merit and at peak, but National Power and
PowerGan are competing only with each other for a critical part of the load curve.
This is why the Director General wanted to introduce more competition in the
generation market, particularly in certain parts of it, more quickly than would
othe~vise occur. In February 1994, he proposed that the two major generators
should sell or dispose of 6,000 MW of coal- or oil-fired plant by December 1995,
and they undertook to do so. This wotdd double the present extent of independent
generation. The undertakings were explicitly designed to introduce more
independent competitors, able to challenge the ability of the two major generators
to increase prices, with the aim of bringing about an industry that would not be
vulnerable to the exercise of market power.
While Offer has had to give its attention to the problems experienced with
competition in generation: there have also been successes. A significant amount of
new entB, has taken place, despite the doubts of some people who wondered before
vesting if any companies would want to enter the market. RECs have been
involved in all but one of the dozen large "independent" stations, but they had
outside partners for ten of these. The first generation of projects were all
supported by long-term contracts which matched their debt repayments, fuel
supplies, and electricity sales. This greatly reduces the risks faced by the station’s
owner.
These stations were following a model created in the United States, where
utilities have been required to buy from independent power producers, where these
offer the best terms, since a law enacted in 1978. Since most American power
companies are vertically integrated, the independent producers would find it
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difficult to sell their power to anyone other than the host utility, and needed long
term contracts for their own security. Effectively, there is competition to obtain
the contract, which then governs the operation of the plant. Some parts of the US
system are now experimenting with conmaon carriage in transmission and with
greater competition in generation.
Two recently announced CCGT projects have taken a different approach,
however. One has long-term contracts, but most of the output has been taken by
IVO from Finland and Tomen Corporation from Japan, which are investing and
buying the contracts on a "merchant basis", taking the full risks of selling at
whatever prices subsequently obtain in the Pool and the contracts market. Eastern
Group, the owner of the other project, has indicated that it is not committing its
supply business to long-term purchases of Contracts for Differences (Cf’Ds) but
instead envisages that its generation business will sell contracts for differences into
the competitive market. These projects seem to represent a further development of
a more competitive market in generation.
Figure 4.2: Real (1990.) Electricity Prices in
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A competitive .market is not an end in itself, of course, but a means
forensuring that a product is delivered to consumers at the right price.
Government surveys allow us to track electricity prices for industrial customers,
shown in Figure 4.2. The size categories do not correspond exactly to the ones
used by the electricity industry - some of the "small sites" have a m:~ximum
demand of more than 100 kW, and became free to choose their supplier from April
1994, while the others are still in the RECs’ franchise. Similarly, some of the
COMPETITION IN THE BRITISH INDUSTRY 65
"medium sites" have a maximum demand of more than I MW, and were in the
competitive market from its beginning in April 1990, while the others remained in
the franchise market until last April.
The introduction of competition in the 1 MW market led to significant initial
reductions for most large customers, typically about 15 per cent but in some cases
up to 25 per cent. Even despite sttbsequent price increases, prices in real terms to
most large customers were still over 10 per cent lower in 1993/94 than in 1989/90.
Some of the very largest customers have experienced significant prices
increases over this period, at least in nominal terms. To a large extent this
reflected a withdrawal of the special terms which they enjoyed before Vesting. In
real terms, prices to these customers were about 3 per cent higher in 1993/94 than
in 1989/90, but the most recent survey data suggests that the average price in the
3’ear to September had returned to its level at Vesting.
For franchise customers in England and Wales, including domestic and small
commercial and industrial customers, the price controls and contractual
arrangements put in place at Vesting envisaged an initial increase in electricity
prices of about 3 per cent in real terms followed by prices held constant in real
terms until April 1993. Prices to franchise electricity, customers did increase, a
little later than planned, but fell in 1993/94, typically by 2-3 per cent.
Customers in the 100 kW market, newly, exposed to competition, reported
price reductions of around 10 per cent from April 1994 compared with prices they
had previously paid. All of their suppliers annotmced either price freezes or price
reductions for remaining franchise customers for 1994/95. In real terms, franchise
prices in England and Wales are 4½ per cent lower than before Vesting. They
should fall further, as the tighter distribution price control announced last summer
takes effect.
Market shares can provide another guide to the state of competition, and Offer
conducts annual surveys on suppliers’ shares of the competitive market, shown in
Figure 4.3. The figures here are broken down into REC first tier (supplying in
their own area) and REC second tier (supplying in another area). The third
segment, called "generators", is dominated by National Power and PowerGen, but
includes the two Scottish Companies, Nuclear Electric, and a few independent
suppliers. Even in the first year, second-tier suppliers took more than two-fiflhs of
the market, nleasured by output, and this has grown to more than three-fifths. Not
all RECs are active in second tier supply, but those which are have taken an
increasing share of the market. The figures shown here exclude the newly
liberalised 100 kW market, where about a quarter of consumers have changed
their supplier.
That experience, and the experience of other utilities where competition has
been introduced, suggests that all groups of customers, including domestic
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Figure 4.3: Market Shares in the Over IMW Market: Consumption
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customers will wish to take advantage of the opportunities to exercise choice.
Offer has recently issued a statement on the issues surrounding the competitive
electricity market from 1998, when the RECs’ exclusive franchise disappears. The
arrangements, which must be capable of satisfacto~, implementation by 1998,
should protect the interests of all customers and encourage new entrants during the
transition to fully effective competition. They should also be cost-effective and in
particular minimise costs and inconvenience to customers seeking second-tier
supply.
At present, second-tier customers require half-hourly metering, so that their
suppliers can settle their accounts in the Pool. This approach is likely to be costly
for domestic customers, and for a transitional period at least, an alternative
arrangement is required. An alternative is to use load profiling, which calculates
bills on the basis of typical consumption patterns between less frequent meter
readings. This would seem to minimise costs and inconvenience and be conducive
to effective competition, although there are numerous details to be resolved. We
hope that it will be possible to test the arrangements with small-scale trials before
1998.
Although most of the attention paid to the British electricity industu, has
concentrated on the vertically separated structure in England and Wales, Offer is
also responsible for regulating vertically integrated companies, in Scotland. The
industry in Scotland had been vertically integrated since the 1950s, and the
government decided to introduce competition on top of the existing structure. As
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far as possible, however, the industu,’s regulation follows the same lines as in
England and Wales.
Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric, the two public electricity
suppliers in Scotland, therefore have to make their transmission and distribution
systems available to third parties, just as the RECs do, at regulated tariffs. The
overall prices paid by small consumers, who cannot change their supplier until
1998, are also regulated.
The main difference is in the way in which generation is treated. In England
and Wales, generation costs are passed through to consumers, but this would not
give consumers sufficient protection in a vertically integrated company. Instead,
the Scottish companies will be allowed to charge die average cost incurred by
RECs in England and Wales in their electricity purchases, which relates the
control to market prices. At present, they use a weighted average of the RECs’
costs and a straight price cap.
Although large customers are free to change their supplier, only about one in
twenty has done so. This may indicate that they are happy with their present
supplier. In a contestable market, the threat of competition is effective in
protecting consumers’ interests and entry is not required to bring prices down.
Certainly, average prices to large consumers fell by a quarter, in real terms, in the
two years following vesting.
Nevertheless, some companies have told Offer that second-tier suppliers in
Scotland find it difficult to secure generation from Scottish Power and Scottish
Hydro-Electric on terms which are as favourable as those offered to their own
supply businesses. The Director-General has said that it may well be appropriate
to put in place arrangements to prohibit the companies from selling to their own
supply businesses on terms which are more favourable than those which they offer
to other suppliers. It may be more difficult to make competition work in a market
which is largely vertically integrated, but Offer is determined to do so.
There are many aspects of Offer’s work which I have not covered, such as
dealing with consumer complaints, and arbitrating certain disputes between
companies. However, l hope I have shown you how the indust~, works, and how
Offer’s approach - competition where it is possible, and regulation where it is not
- has helped to make it work better.
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Chapter 5
COMPE’ITTION IN THE NOICDIC I£LI£CTRICITY INDUSTI~ Y
Ole Jess Olsen, Roskilde University
5. l. Introduction
The focus of this paper is on the major transition of the electricity supply
industD, that is now taking place in the Nordic countries. In Europe, Britain
started reforming its industry in 1990. Norway followed the year after. Sweden
attd Finland will soon join the group of reform countries. The European
Commission presented a first draft directive on limited competition in the Union in
late 1991 and has since been elaborating on the final version.
The approaches of the Commission and of the individual countries are
different. There is, however, a difference in terms of their radicalism rather titan in
tenns of their basic philosophy. In both approaches a distinction between the
generation and supply of electricity, on the one hand, and network services
(transmission and distribution), on the other, is central. Like most other industries,
generation and supply should be regulated by allowing competition, whereas
transmission and distribution are still considered natural monopolies and should be
regulated as such. To ensure that competition will be "workable", it is necessary to
separate competitive activities front monopoly activities and to assign the network
operators with common carrier obligations ("third part access" in the European
jargon).
The British and the Nordic refomls differ with respect to their political
background. The British refomt started with privatisation which was never a real
issue in the preparation of the Nordic reforms (the reform proposals were
presented by Social Democratic governments).
In the next section, the Scandinavian electricity industn, is introduced with
respect to production, consumption, perfonnance and regulation. The third section
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is devoted to a presentation of the reforms in Norway, Sweden and Finland. The
main emphasis will be on Norway which so far is the only country that has
implemented a fully compctitive market. Sweden and Finland will only be
discussed with respect to issues where their reforms differ from the Norwegian
ease.
In contrast to the other Nordic countries, Denmark is reluctant about
introducing competition in the electricity industry. The Danish electricity industry
is presented in more detail in section four. The possible consequences of
introducing competition in Denmark are discussed in the final section. The
conclusion is that the Danish electricity industry should have good possibilities of
survival on an open Northern European market. Major changes of the prescnt
Danish regulatou, system will, however, be necessary.
5.2. The Nordic Electricity Industry
The electricity industu, has, in many respects, developed the same
organisational structure in the three Nordic countries that have now decided to
introduce competition. To begin with, the industry was organised on a local basis.
Supply of electricity was either established by large energy-intensive enterprises
for their own purposes or by municipalities in towns and cities. As the large
enterprises were often placed in the count~,side, they started to supply the local
(regional) community as well.
The state also participated, primarily by developing the large hydro-power
installations that earlier this century becan~c an important power source. Around
the Second World War, the state-owned power administrations became responsible
for establishing a nationally integrated power industry. They constructed the
missing transmission lines for the national grid and becanae the leaders of the clubs
of large producers, opening up the possibility of cost-minimising exchanges of
power.
Today, the state-owned power companies (Statkraft in Norway, Vattenfall in
Sweden and lmatran Voima in Finland) control about 25-50 per cent of power
generation and the main part of the transmission grid. The remaining part of
generation is divided between large manufacturing enterprises and municipal
energy administrations in the large cities.
The organisational development of the Danish electricity industry was
different. It was either organised by municipalities or (outside the cities) by
consumer co-operatives. There was no hydro-power to motivate large-scale
integration. After the Second World War the system has gradually become much
more concentrated by mergers and co-operation and is now organised into two
regional power associations (more details will be given in Section 5.4.1).
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Different natural endowments and different organisational histories have
resulted in large differences among the four Nordic countries regarding production
technology and market concentration. Market concentration is highest in Denmark
and Sweden (Herfindahl’s iodex is 0.45 and 0.32 respectively), lowest in No~vay
(Herfindahl’s index is 0.07) and with Finland in between (Herfindahl’s index is
0.17).
Power is generated from different technologies in the four countries (see
Table5.1). All the Norwegian power supply comes from hydro-power; the
Swedish supply is divided equally between hydro-power and nuclear power;
Denmark is supplied by conventional (coal) condensing power and combined heat
and power (CHP); Finland has a bit of everything
Table 5. I : 777e Composition of Generating Capacity and Power Supply in the
l;’our Nordic Countries. 1993
Denmark Norway Sweden Finland
Capacity Production Capaci0, ProducOo Capacity Production Capacity Production
tGIIO (TWh)    (GII9 n (Tll’h) (GII9 (’Ilfh)    (GH9    (TII~I
I lydro-power
Nuclear Irawer
Condensing 3.5 30.5
power
F.x’lraction-
cond~lsing
5. Ipower~
Combined heat 0.9 0.5
and power (back
pr~gure)
Other (wind 0.5 1.0
t urblnt..s)
Total 10.0 32.0
Imports 6.3
Exports 5. I ¯
27.0 119.7 16.5 73.3 2.8 13.5
10.0 58.9 2.3 18.8
0.1 0.1 2.8 0.5 3.6 7.3
0.2 0.3 3.6 g.0 4.7 18.6
1.9 0.2 0.9 0.0
27.3 120.1 34.8 140.9 14.3 58.1
0.7 S.0 7.92
8.5 8.6 0.4
Most large generating sets in Denmark use riffs technology for combined production of
heat and power (scc Section 5.4.2 for more details).
Inchlding imports front Russia.
Including exports to Germany.
Source: Nordel, Annual Report 1993, and Elsam, Udbygningskriterier og
omkostningsstmtktur, 1994.
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These differences make power exchanges very beneficial (e.g., exchanges
between producers of condensing power and producers of hydro-power). Since the
1960s, the four countries have exploited this possibiliu, through the Nordic power
pool (Nordel). It was organised directly by the large generating companies (before
the reforms, these companies were also responsible for the transmission lines) in
the four countries and have resulted in relatively large exchanges of power. Since
then, the participants in this Nordic club are supposed to have enough capaci~, for
their own supply this means that transactions are mostly based on short-term
excess capacity.
The generating companies sell a part of their production directly to final
customers (often energy-intensive industries). The rest is sold to local distributors,
that are mainly owned by municipalities or regional authorities. There are more
than one hundred of such distributing utilities in each country.
Patterns of consumption are different. Finland, Nonvay and Sweden have
many large, energy-intensive industries (metallurgy, paper and pulp) that use
electricity in their production. Eleetrici~, is also used as a main source of heating
by households and business firms. The three countries therefore consume relatively
large quantities of eleetrici~, per inhabitant. Denmark has only a few
energy-intensive industries and primarily uses other forms of heating, resulting in
much lower electricity consumption per inhabitant (see Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Consumption of Electricity in 1993 (in GWh)
Denmark Norwa), Sweden Finland
Indusl~’                                     9.817 42.005 49.452 34.180
"I’rnrL~port 200 680 2,400 450
Sep.,ict.~ and households 21.081 52.357 72.814 28.100
"I’otld ’ 31.098 95,042 124.666 62,730
Per ilgazhitant (in kwh) 6.387 23.984 15.214 12.929
’ Net of transmission and distribution losses.
Source: NordeL Annual Report 1993,
In a European context, the Nordic electricity industry performs well. This is
reflected in both lower prices than elsewhere (see Table 5.3) and high quality
(constant frequency and voltage, few outages). The good performance can be
explained by a combination of natural endownlents (large resources of
hydro-power), exploitation of beneficial exchanges between different technologies
(inside each countu, as well as through the Nordel) and control against misuses of
monopoly status.
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Before the reforms, regulation of the electricity supply industry was organised
differently in the four Nordic countries. Political control was most direct in
Norway. Until recently the state-owned power administration did not have a
separate identity, but was part of the ministu,. Its prices were approved by
Parliament. In Sweden and Finland, the state-owned power industries were
organised as enterprises with a separate identity. In all three countries, the state
sector has had an important role as price leader for wholesale power. This role
has, ,’mlong other things, been used to favour large energy,-intensivc industries by
providing them with cheap power (price discrimination is most extended in
Norway). Denmark is different from the other three countries as the state never
participated directly in the electricity supply indust~,.
Table 5.3: A Comparison of European ElectriciO, Prices (in FCU/kWh. as at
,January 1, 1993. lrxcluding 7"axes. UNIPEDI;_’)I
Country                 Household                Industry
3 500 kwh              2 500 MWh
Nordic Countries
I)elmlark 0.06 0.05
Swede1 (Stockholm) 0.06 0.05 "
yo,~,.~y (O~lo) 0.05 0.05
Finland (I lelsi~tki) 0.06 0.05
European Union
Germany O. 120 0. 100
F~.~¢¢ 0.106 0.080
Netherlands (PEN) 0.090 0.060
I~lgium 0. I I 0 0.090
Italy 0.168 0.090"
Spain 0.140 0.090
portug.~l O. 140 O. I I 0
~reland 0.090 0.080
England (l~ondon) 0.11 I (South) 0.075
Average prices (tariffS) in ECU per kWh (amd exchange rates) as at Janua~’ I, 1993, excluding taxes.
Source: UNI PEDE. Economi~ and "l’ari fl~ Study Conuniuee, Prices of Electricity as at January 1, 1993.
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The distributing utilities possess(ed) regional or local monopolies of supply. In
Norway and Sweden, these monopolies are defined in concessions issued by the
state authorities. In Denmark and Finland, they are provided by local authorities.
Until the present reforms of the electricity supply industr),, Finland has been the
most liberal of the four countries. According to the present Finnish electricity act,
competition is legal in both generation and transmission. In practice, however, the
Finnish industr), is controlled by a club of large producers with regional
monopolies of supply.
There has been some price control by public authorities in all four countries,
both by state authorities and local authorities. The applied price principles have
not been sophisticated and public control not severe. In Denmark, the electric
utilities have referred their tariffs to a special agency under the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission. This agency has only intervened in those cases where a
tariff was considered to violate the applied price principles (see Section 5.4.3). In
the other three countries, there have been no general price control. The controlling
agency (usually the Energy Agency) has evaluated concrete cases of complaint on
an ad hoc basis.
5.3. Introducing Reforms
5.3. I. The Norwegian Reform
Norway was the first Nordic countr), to reform its industD,. Its main
motivation came from internal concerns about economic inefficiencies in the form
of over capacity and a distorted price structure. The reformers were high ranking
civil servants in the Norwegian MinistD, of Energy who gained general political
backing from the leading political parties. They also received important intellectual
support from the academic community, where the economists had for a long time
c.riticised the organisation of the electricity, supply industrT as being inefficient (see
Hope, Rud and Singh, 1995).
The reform was defined in a new electriciD, act approved by the Norwegian
Parliament in 1990 and put into practice in 1991. The main provisions stipulated
in the new act are the following:
I. Third part3, access (TPA) for all customers (not temporarily restricted to
large customers as in the United Kingdom). Ever), customer in Norway
can make a contract to purchase electricit7 from ever), producer or
wholesaler in the country.
2. The distributing utilities need a concession from the Energy Agency that
provides them with a net monopoly for their area (other companies are not
allowed to construct competing networks). Obligations are asymmetrically
defined: The distributing utilities have an obligation to supply all
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customers in their concessionary area, but these are not obliged to buy
electricity from the local distributor.
3. If a customer uses his/her right to purchase electricity from another
company, the local distributor must accept dlat and can only charge the
customer for network costs and for administrative costs (e.g., separate
metering). These tariffs should be cost-based and are controlled by the
Ministry. The price of electricity (the energy supply): however, is free. It
is supposed to be controlled by market forces.
4. Many Norwegian electric utilities are vertically integrated (they both
generate and distribute power). To avoid cross-subsidisation, utilities with
an area concession for distribution arc obliged to keep separate accounts
for tlacir network and supply activities (so-called "unbundling").
The new law has been followed by a number of additional organisational
measures to secure effective competition:
I. The state-owned power company has been separated into a generating
company (Statkraft) and a transmission company (Stamett). The former is
supposed to compete on equal terms with other suppliers, whereas tlae
transmission company has been assigned the overall responsibility for the
quality of the national electricity supply (like the National Grid Company
in the United Kingdom). Neither the two state-owned companies nor the
many utilities owned by local or regional authorities has been privatised.
The purpose of the Norwegian reform was to improve the performance of
the electricity supply industry by introducing competition. Privatisation
was never an important political issue in the discussions of the reform.
2. Since 1971, the large producers had organised a spot market (the
Norwegian Power Pool) for exchanges of occasional power. It has now
been opened for other actors (primarily large purchasers and brokers in
electricity).I In Norway it is not obligatou, to use the power poot as it is in
tile United Kingdom. The price-determining mechanism is also different.2
About 20 per cent of the total power supply in Norway is traded by the
pool. The rest is traded directly by contracts between producers
(wholesalers) and buyers of electricity. It has, however, become more
It is organised as ~l subsidiary of the state-o~l~ed trm~smission company (Stntnca Marked)
with a board of directors appointed by the users of the pool.
"ll~e basic unit for mtlrket clearing and settlement is the hour. Nommlly, only six price
sections arc being issued ix:r day. They ore detcnnined in advance by the pool administrator.
"llle market participants state their supply and demand in the form of n number of
price<luantity combin~nions Ibr each price section. This information is then being aggregated
by the pool adlninistn~tor, deriving supply and demand schedules and determining the
equilibrium price for cach price section (see Hope, Rud and Singh, 1995).
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common for contracts to include clauses that relate the contract price to
the pool price (see Andersen, et aL. 1994).
3. Ideally, the choice of electricity supplier by a customer (which could be a
household, an industrial firm or a local distributing utility,) should only, be
influenced by the price and supply conditions offered by competing
suppliers. In practice, this choice can be strongly influenced by different
transport and transaction costs (buying electrici~, from a non-adjacent
supplier requires negotiations with the owners of the networks
in-between). To reduce such costs, and thereby approach the ideal
situation, a point tariff system that covers the whole national tcrrito~, has
been introduced. The tariff refers to the point where the supplier or
customer is connected to a network, and it covers all relevant costs (it
includes for instance payments from the owner of the local network for
being connected to the superior regional and national networks).3
Competition in the Norwegian reform considers only intemal transactions.
Foreign trade is still subject to certain restrictions such as the amount of power
that can be exported each year. Foreign power companies have access to the power
pool but not on equal terms with Norwegian companies. The background for this
restriction is fear of increasing power prices for the large energy-intensive
industries. It was a political precondition of the reform that these industries should
continue to be favoured by low prices.
So far, the main results of the Norwegian reform are lower prices for those
groups (in particular business firms) that before were not favoured by price
discrimination. Some utilities have been threatened by bankruptcy. Both effects
were to be expected in the short run: because many utilities had constructed too
much and too expensive new capacity in the years preceding the reform; and
because the practice of price discriminations was common.
5.3.2. The Swedish and Finnish Proposals
Sweden and Finland have prepared proposals for reforms of their electricity
supply industry. In most aspects these reforms are similar to the Norwegian
reform. The Swedish proposal was transformed into a new electricity act that was
presented to Parlianlent in Spring 1994 and planned to be implemented from
Januau, 1995 (see Swedish Government, 1994). However, the general election in
September and the subsequent change of government resulted in a postponement of
the new law. It is, however, not likely that this will end with the law being
cancelled.
The variable parks of the new transmission tariff are consmlcted to reflect timc mad location
specific loads and congestions (see Stntnett, 1993).
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During the preparations of the Swedish reform it was suggested to exempt the
distributing utilities from their obligation of supply (included in the Norwegian
electricity act). The new Swedish (general) competition law (from 1993) was
expected to provide the necessau, powers to avoid exploitation of electrici~,
consumers. Doubts about this provision of the proposed electricity law and its
consequences for electricity prices in thinly populated areas have served as the
main excuse for postponing the law. Most likely, an obligation to supply such
customers and some control of the prices they are charged will be included in the
revised act.
In Sweden, there is no wish to restrict foreign trade as in Norway. One
problem, however, will be the vcu, concentrated generating sector (the two largest
generators control 50 and 25 per cent of production respectively). Without
measures to decrease concentration, the outcome can ve~, well be monopolistic
pricing (see Bergman and Andersson, 1995). One option will be to separate the
state-owned power company, Vattenfall, into two or more independent companies.
Another option will be to integrate the Swedish market with the Norwegian market
(this option is ve~, much advocated by the new transmission company, Svenska
Kraftngit, that wishes to participate in the joint organisation of a
Norwegian-Swedish power pool).
So far the proposal for the Finnish reform has not been transformed into a new
electricity act. It is expected to be presented to Parliament this year and to be
enacted in 1996. It will probably be less restrictive regarding the network
(transmission and distribution) monopoly than the Norwegian and Swedish
reforms (see R~inntiri, 1995; and Finnish Government, 1993). There will be no
restrictions on foreign trade (Finland is in contrast to Nonvay and Sweden a net
importer of power).
Becanse of the reforms, the Norwegian and the Swedish electricity industries
have started to construct cables to the Continent and to negotiate long-term
contracts with continental companies (in particular in Germany mid The
Netherlands).
5.4. The L)anish Electricity lndnsto~
5.4. I. Organisation
The Danish electricity supply indust~, consists of two vertically integrated
regional systems. About ninety, distributing utilities of widely different sizes oxwt
nine generating companies4 that co-operate in two regional associations (see
Figure 5.1). The latter are responsible for fuel purchases, central dispatch and
One utility, the Copenhagen Power Compariy (Kobenhavns 13elysningsvazscn), is vertically
integrated.
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international trade. The two regional associations have hitherto not been
connected, but a cable has now been decided. All electric utilities except one are
municipal enterprises or consumer co-operatives (and the exception is a joint stock
company owned by municipalities).
Figure 5. I : The Organisational Structure of the l)anish Electricity Supply
lndust~
{Level3- RegionalAssociatJon ]
ievel~. D1s~ngevel 2 " POwer COmpany I~
Each generating company has its own area of supply. The distributing utilities
in the area will buy all their power from this company, which they own. Tile
distributing utilities arc exclusively serving a franchise market. They arc obliged to
serve all demand (up to the capacity of the installations at the customers’ premises)
and the customers cannot make contracts with alternative suppliers.
The two regional systems are organised as tight pools with economic dispatch.
It means that the power stations arc being dispatched by, the regional centre
according to a merit order that reflects increasing variable (energy) costs. As the
Danish system is almost exc us vely ~ " of the. fuc -based (coal-). the energy efficiency
power plant is a main determinant of variable costs (new plant is more efficient
than old plant). Electricity is being imported from the hydro-power and nuclear
power systems in Norway and Sweden, whenever available at a lower cost than
self-generation.6
The filnmccs of thc large generation ~ts can burn different qtmlities of coal and can easily bc
shifted to oil; a few of them also to gas. Most of the deccntraliscd CHP-pl~mt is gas-fired.
6 In some 3’ears up to 40 per cent of the Danish electricity consumption is imported
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Most power plants are located close to the consumption centres and the quality
of the transmission and distribution networks is high. Because of that transport
costs are relatively low and only under very exceptional circumstances will
network constraints be relevant.
5. 4. 2. Technology and Costs
Danish power generation is nearly exclusively based on themlal capacity (see
Table 5.1).7 Since the 1970s, coal has been the dominating fuel. Because of
environmental restrictions, gas and biomass are likely to substitute a part of the
coal in the future. There are three major types of steam turbines in the present
Danish power system:
I. Condensing units without co-generation (primarily older generating sets).
2. Back-pressure units producing power and heat in a fixed relationship
imposed by the technical lay-out of the turbine (used by small combined
heat and power (CHP) generating sets).
3. Extraction-condensing units, which allow both condensing and
back-pressure mode production in a flexible combination of power and
heat (used by all newer large CHP-generating sets
Co-generation has become very important durmg the recent decade. Since
198t all new large units have been located near the large urban ceutres with a
district heating grid. After the new Heat Act of 1990 it was made obligatory for all
district heating systems to substitute their heat boilers by back-pressure traits. It
means that the future generating system will be dominated to an even larger degree
than the present by CHP-capacity.
Production costs of electricity from CHP-units will depend on the cost-sharing
between heat and power. For rational actors the cost allocation rule cannot result
in costs that are higher than the stand-alone costs of each product. Stand-alone
costs for themlal power are equal to the costs of condensing production (B in
Figure 5.2) and for district beating they are equal to the costs of a heat-only boiler
(point C). The relevant cost of power generation will be in the interval between
these two extremes (this "bargaining line" is BC in Figure 5.2).
In Table 5.4 the teclmical paranacters of two large and one small CHP-plants
are presented. They all represent technologies that are being commissioned in
Denmark m these years.
7 The non-thermal capacity consists mainly of wind turbines.
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Figure 5.2: Cost Sharing Between Heat and Power
Table 5.4: Technical Data and t roduction Costs for Three CHI -units
250-500 MW 50-100 MW
ILk:traction-condensing Back-pressure
Fuel Coal Gas (Comb,cycle) Gas (Comb.cycle)
Electricity/heat ratio, C~, 0.65
Electricity loss ratio, Cv 0.15
Total efficiencb’,q,, 0.88
Electric efliciency,qp 0.45
Investments costs (mill. 6.94
DKK/kWh)
Operation and maintenance in 3
per cent of investments cost
1.10 1.05
0.17
0.91 0.90
0.55
5.37 6.44
2 3
Source: Grohnheit and OlserL 1994.
5.4.3. Regulation and Performance
The Danish electric utilities are strongly regulated. New plant is subject to
prior approval by ministerial as well as by local authorities. The authorities do not
limit their role to a discussion of the proposals made by the industry. Because of
raising environmental ambitions during the last decade, the Minist~, of Energy has
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tried to enforce specific capacity choices on the electric utilities. Examples are
wind turbines, small local CHP-units and the use of gas and biofuels instead of
coal.
The power generators are subject to regulations to reduce emissions of SO2~
NO~ and CO,. Recently, it has been made obligatou, for the electric utilities to
prepare plans for Demand ,STde Management and Integrated Resource Planning.
Part of the regulations are specified in public laws. Another part is included in
agreements between the Government and representatives of the industry (most
often the regional associations). Danish administrative practice has a long tradition
of such co-operative (corporative) arrangements. Examples are agreements
according to which the utilities agree to build a specified amount of wind turbines
and small local CHP-plant. Another example is the regulation of emissions of SO2
and NO~. The Government has after negotiations with the electricity supply
indust~, specified quotas for the total emissions. How to reach the agreed target is,
however, up to internal decisions by the industry (it can install FGD-equipment or
switch to fi~els with lower emissions).
The electric utilities are also subject to price control. Tariffs should be
calculated according to a set of rules issued by the state authorities in co-operation
with the Association of Electric Utilities and referred to the Electricity Price Board
(under the competition authorities). Tariffs are, however, not subject to prior
approval. Utilities are supposed to break even: surpluses (deficits) in one year
mean price reductions (increases) in the following ),ear. New plant is financed by a
mark-up on rates during the period of construction (including the 3,ears
immediately before and after).
The co--operative (corporative) administrative tradition is also reflected in the
composition of the price board. The members arc appointed by the Minister, but
most of them as representatives of the electric utilities and their customers.
Decisions are usually based on consensus and implemented in co-operation with
the Association of Electric Utilities.
The dominant pricing rule is "cost of service" (including depreciation and
interest charges). There has been a tendency in the post-war period towards more
simple tariffs, the rationale of which are lower average energy costs and higher
metering costs. Therefore, most tariffs are simple two-part tariffs with a fixed
element covering administrative costs and a variable element covering all the rest
(mainly purchases of power and distributiou). Peak load pricing is common for
wholesale to distributing utilities and large customers and is now being opened as
an option for other groups of customers.
As the Danish electricit), supply industu, is increasingly a CHP-system, the
allocation of the common generating costs between heat and power is important.
So far, the benefits from joint production of heat and power have been assigned to
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the heat customers. It means that electricity customers pay the generating costs of
condensing power (see Figure 5.2).
5.5. The Consequences of Introducing Competition in Denmark
Low production costs, cost-based tariffs and a tradition for exploiting
advantages of foreign trade all together indicates a Danish industu, with a strong
initial position on a competitive European market.
Despite that, the introduction of competition in the electricity supply industry
has few supporters in Denmark. The industry is against it. Consumers will find
few incentives from a comparison of their prices with the prices in most other
European countries. The politicians fear that an open market can be a threat to
national energy policies. Therefore, changes can only be initiated by pressures
from external actors.
5.5. I. Organisational Consequences
The Danish electricity industry will have no difficulties adapting to die formal
organisational requirements included in the proposed EU-directive (limited third
party access and unbundling of accounts). Adaptation will only, require that the
generators separate their accounts for generation and transmission. The
distributing utilities own the generators and are by tradition strongly integrated
with them. With one exception (see Figure 5.1), however, generation and
distribution are separated in different firms.
The many limitations and the lack of facilitating arrangements in the proposed
EU-directive do not make it a powerful device for introducing competition in the
Union. More relevant for the Danish utilities, therefore, is the outcome of the
Nordic refomas. The Nordic organisation of co-operation, Nordel, is already
adapting its membership8 and rules to the new conditions. An extension of the
Norwegian spot market to include Sweden and Finland, which is now being
proposed, will work in the same direction. The new transmission lines between the
Nordic countries and Germany, which are either under construction or are being
discussed, will facilitate integration with the Continent as well and thereby
increase competition for access to the cheap resources of hydro-power in Norway
and Sweden (Germany is a high-cost countu,). To continue to have access to these
resources, Denmark must adapt and give the producers in the other Nordic
countries access to its market.
The concrete organisational responses of the Danish industry will be
determined by the dynamics of this Northern European market:
The two new transmission companies in Norway and Sweden, Statnctt m~d Svenska Kraftn/It,
have been inchlded.
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1. The present tendency towards fiJrther concentration of both generation
and distribution will be continued. The ties upholding vertical integration
will not be loosened and only the minimum requirements of vertical
separation stipulated in the EU-provisions (unbundling of accounts) will
be implemented. Under these assumptions, the main differences from
today will therefore be the new nlechanisms for exchanging power across
national borders and the adaptation of contracts and tariff structures to
prevent by-pass.
Vertical and horizontal disintegration will be the result of the many new
conflicts caused by the opening of a competitive market for electricity.
Tile distributing utilities will exploit the possibilities of alternative
suppliers and will separate from the generating companies. The
co-operation among the latter in the regional associations will dissolve.
Some concentration will take place to reach the necessary ’;minimum scale
of efficiency" of the new European electricity market (3-5 generating
companies and 15-20 distributing utilities are left).
The organisationa[ dynamics determining whether the integrated or the
disintegrated future will be realised depends ve~, much on the competitiveness of
Danish CHP-power. If it turns out to be competitive, tile distributing utilities will
have few incentives to find alternative suppliers, and vice versa, if it turns out not
to be competitive. Therefore, the competitiveness of CHP-production is crucial for
tile organisational outcome. I will deal with that problem in file next section.
5.5.2. Is Danish CHP Competitive?
Different power generating technologies are characterised by different cost
profiles (e.g., concerning the ratio between fixed and variable costs). The
nationally closed markets for power have also allowed very different costs for the
same technology to occur. In a recent report from the Swedish Energy Agency
(Nutek, 1993), tile reported costs of the same (new) generating technology varied
in some cases with more than 100 per cent anaong different European countries.
Such cost differences have several sources: protection of national industries (coal
mines and manufacturers of generating equipment), exploitation of monopoly, cost
inefficiencies due to organisational slack, rind Iocational advantages (Danish power
plants are coast-based and therefore do not need expensive cooling towers).
Fuel and generating equipment are internationally traded goods. Therefore, it
is reasonable to expect cost differences for fuel-based generating technologies to
disappear in an open market. Subsidies will disappear (or be paid directly to the
coal mines) and existing inefficiencies will be squeezed away.
It is important to distinguish between the short and the long rt~n. With the
present prices there is too much capacity in Northern Europe. Therefore, it is
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likely that prices in a period after the opening of the market will decrease
(eventually to the variable costs of the marginal technology). Such price cuts will
stimulate demand. An increase in demand is also likely to come from exogenous
sources (population increases and higher standards of living). Demand growth and
an increasing need of replacements will cause prices to go up in the longer run
(eventually to a ha,el where the construction of new capaci~, will become
profitable).
Table 5.5: Generating Costs of New Capacity (US mills per kwh)I
Ntlclear Coal (electricity only) Natural Gas
(electricity only)
Genllany 51.4 79. I
UK 4g~, 4-51.6 46,g-51.6 45.2
Denmark 35.1 35,1-37.4
Finland 30. I 35 35.3
5 per cent discount raze.
Source: Nutek, 1993.
Some price differences will, however, persist due to transport costs and
limitations on transmission capacity. A continuation of market imperfections can,
of course, also be the cause of price differences.
The competing technologies are presented in Table 5.6. Nuclear power has
low marginal costs (0.06-0.07 DKK per kWh). As it is costly to change the load,
nuc}ear power will be used as base load and will not be the price-setting
technology under nomral conditions. For political reasons it is not very likely that
new nuclear capacity will be constructed in Germany mad Sweden.9 In Denmark
and Notavay, nuclear technology is not on the agenda at all.
Hydro-power (with a water reservoir) is the most flexible generating
technology. It can be stopped and started quickly and with little direct cost.
Generators will therefore prefer to produce when demand and prices are high. In
such periods, however, technologies with higher variable costs such as condensing
power will detemline the price (hydro-power will be intramarginal). Direct
variable costs are extremely low, 0.01-0.02 DKK per kWh. It can be argued,
however, that opportunity costs are higher for a hydro plant with a water reservoir,
because of the possibility of storing the water and selling it at another time.
Amundsen et al. (1993) quote an average value of 0.06 DKK per kWh)°
Nuclc~lr power is still a politically realistic option in Finland.
The w~lter value is based on exlyectations of future values of precipitation, dem~utd, output
~d prices. It is thcrelbrc detnitable if an "tiverage water value" is a meaningfld concept at
all.
COMPETITION IN THE NORDIC ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 85
The availabilib, of new low-cost hydro-powcr resources is ve~, limited in the
Nordic cotintries (additionally 10 TWh can be exploited annually in Nonvay to a
unit cost in the range of 0.18-0.22 DKK per kWh and less in Sweden and
Finland).
Thermal (condensing) power (coal and in increasing measure gas) is likely to
become the marginal, price-setting technology most of the time on a Northern
European nmrket with competition. It is also the technology that is likely to be
constructed to cover an increase in demand. This is the case for Denmark, Finland
and Gemaany, but it can be relevant in the future for Norway and Sweden as well
(because new hydro-power is more expensive than new themlal power and because
Sweden politically is committed to substitute its nuclear capacity before 2010). As
all countries will have access to the same technology, 1 assume similar cost
characteristics as for the Danish plants presented in Table 5.4 (and veO’ different
from the unit cost reported in Table 5.5).n
Table 5.6: Short- and Long-term Marginal Costs of Different Technologies for
Power Production (DKK/kWh. 1990-prices)"
Low Fuel CostI High F’ttel Cost"
,Short term Long term ,Short term Long term
Snmll local gas-fired ClIP 0.08 0.19
Central coal-fired ClIP 0.06 0.19
Central gas-fired ClIP 0.07 0.15
Coal condt.nlsing 0.12 0.24
Ccnt~l g:ls eondetlsing 0.12 0.19
Nuclear (France and Finland)’ 0.06 0.22
Nuclear (Gcrxuany)~ 0.07 0.36
Hydro (direcl variable cosl) 0.02 O. 18
Hydro (water vMue) 0.06 0.22
0.12 0.24
0.07 0.21
0.12 0.2
0.14 0.28
0.19 0.28
* 5200 atmual hours of production for all tectulologics, 5% intt.~t.
12.43 DKK/GJ for coal and 16.29 DKKJGJ for gas.
2    16.29 DKK/GJ for coal and 29.22 DKK/GJ Ibr gas.
Source: OECI) Nuclear Energy Agcncy/lntcmatiolml Energy Agency, Projected Costs of
Generating Electrici(v. Ulxlate 1992, Paris 1993.
The supply costs to the Danish market will include transmission costs. For
new capaciW: these have been calculated to 0.04-0.05 DKK per kWh (including
As most German thcnnal plant will be placed inland and therefore requires more expensive
cooling, this represents a con.~ervative asslunption with resider to the competitiveness of
Danish producers.
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transmission loses, and under the assumption of an annual use of 8,000 hours, see
Bjorvatn and Bjomdalen, 1993) from Norway to Denmark. Similar costs can be
assumed for transmission from Sweden to West Denmark and from Germany to
East Denmark. Transmission costs are negligible from Sweden to East Denmark
and from Germany to West Denmark.
What are the prospects for Danish CHP on a future open market in Northern
Europe with these technologies? It appears from Table 5.6 that CHIP has lower or
similar (short-term) marginal costs as most of the competing technologies. The
only exception will be hydro-power (and nuclear power if the alternative is to
decrease the load). In such situations, however, transmission costs will provide the
Danish market with some protection. The Danish CHP-technologies are
competitive in a long-term perspective, when the relevant alternative for the
competing technologies is to construct new capaci~, and transport power to
Denmark.
Amundsen et al. (1993 and 1994) have developed two equilibrium models for
the study of prices, output and trade on an integrated (North-CentralL~) European
market for power. One model analyses the short-term perspective whereas the
other deals with the long-term perspective.
The long-term model (Amundsen et aL, 1993) determines national
consumption and volume trade in electricity in year 2000 based on existing and
newly constructed transmission lines. The model takes account of existing
production capacity in the various regions and calculates the optimal expansion of
new production capacity. Calculations are based on the assumption of efficiency
in production, free trade in electricity and the possibili~, of constructing new
transmission lines. The resulting equilibrium prices are reported in Table 5.7.
The price in Denmark will be 0.25 DKK per kWh under the assumptions of
free competition of the model (which includes average precipitation in Norway).
This is similar to the unit cost of new coal condensing capacity and above the unit
cost of new CHP--capacity in Denmark.
The other model (Amundsen et al., 1994) calculates time-differentiated
equilibrium prices under the assumption of existing generating and transmission
capacity. The time periods are: summer day, summer night, winter day and winter
night (see Table 5.8). The over-capacity mentioned above is reflected in lower
equilibrium prices than in the long-run model.
Most of the resulting prices on the Danish market are above the short-term
marginal costs of CHP reported in Table 5.6 (under the assumption of high fuel
costs, the price on a summer night will be lower than the marginal costs of the t~vo
gas-fired CHP-plants). The calculated price differences among the four periods are
The Norwegian models include more countries than di~ussed here. The Benelux countries,
France and the LrK are included in ,Aantuldsen et al. (1993), whereas Italy, Austria and
Switz_erland are also included in Amundsen et al. (1994).
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not large. This reflects, among other things, the modi~,ing influence of
hydro-power that is not exposed to the same peak load problems as thermal
production capaci~,.
Table 5.7: Calculated Prices" in ),ear 2000 on a Northern European
Competitive Market for Power (DDK/kWh)
Initial situation Free competition C02-tfzr (105 per No~,egian exports
without competition O~ar 2000) barrel oil) (year restricted to I0 Tll"h
(1988-data) 2000) annually O~ar
2000)
No,~,’.y 0.20 0.20 0.21 0. I 7
Swe~n 0.2 I 0.21 0.22 0.2 I
Finland 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
I~n,~rk 0.3 I 0.25 0.22 0.30
Wesl Germany 0.32 0.27 0.25 0.31
* Wholesale pricc~ excluding tntm~lission co~
Source: tkmu~ el al.. 1993.
Table 5.8: 77me Differentiated Prices on o Northern European Competitive
Market for Power (DDK/kWh)
Period Summer day Summer night    Winter day Winter night
Per cent of 31 13 39 17
yearI
Norway 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Sweden 0.1 I 0.11 0.1 I 0.1 I
Finland O, I I 0. I I 0, I I 0. I I
I~nmrk 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.ll
W~t Gemumy 0.14 0.08 0.16 0. I I
Varies a bit mnong the five cotultrics.
Source: 0~1 ¢~lculations fr~n Amundsen et al. (1004)
5.5.3. Regulatou, Problems
The analysis of production costs and market prices on an open Northern
European power market tells us that Danish CHP-producers will have good
possibilities to compete and thereby survive. It also tells us that Danish consumers
can expect lower prices in the short run, and prices that are not so different from
the present tariffs in the long run.
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The Danish utilities often mention the constraints created by the different time
profiles of electricity and heat load as a problem of CHP in an open market. They
have added some flexibiliD, to the system by using extraction-condensing plant and
heat storing facilities. In my opinion, access to a large and open market will create
further flexibility to the system Along with its own distributing companies, power
can now be sold on the External market, either on the spot market or on long-term
contracts with other utilities ,and customers. Contract terms can be deternfined to
suit each individual case. It should therefore not be too difficult for the regional
associations to design contracts that can match the attempts of by-pass.~3
The exploitation of these possibilities, however, presupposes an adaptation of
the Danish regulator5., system to the conditions of a competitive market. As in most
other countries, the present regulations have been designed for vertically integrated
monopolies with exclusive rights. Without changes serious problems will be the
result under competitive conditions. This is the case with both sections of public
regulation: monopoly and enviromnent.
(a) Regulation of monopoly:
The generators are supposed to compete in production and supply with other
companies. The present system where all utilities are required to break even and
new plant is financed by mark-ups on the power price during the period of
construction is not viable under competition. There should be no direct price
control of generators under competitive conditions and they should finance their
plant as under normal business conditions.
In Section 2 the Danish industry was characterised as the most concentrated of
the Nordic electricity industries. Despite that, I do not consider it necessau, to
dissolve the present co-operation in the two regional associations. These
associations are relatively small compared to the potential competitors in the
surrounding countries. Forced separation could result in economic units that will
not be viable under future competitive conditions. Further, a high degree of
concentration on the domestic market is not likely to result in monopolistic
domination because of the large transmission capaciB, that connects Denmark with
its neighbouring countries. In particular, the existence of low cost producers in
Norway and SwedEn will make the market contestablE.
The distributing utilities will continue as regulated monopolies. Their tariffs
must remain under public control that makes it possible to continue with the
present financial regime. There are, however, reasons why this is not a good idea.
Under competitive conditions the scope of regulation will be enlarged. Third party
One of tile generators in the I~tstem txm of I)cnmark, SK, Ires recently concluded ~t contract
on exchange of ownership with the Swedish statc-ox~aled generator, Vanenfnll. O~11ership in
-some of Vauenfall’s hydro power pltmLs will be exchanged for ownership in a plalmcd
extraction-condensing piton in the Copenhagen ~trea to be constructed by SK.
COMPETITION IN THE NORDIC ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 89
access requires that competing suppliers are treated equally for access to networks
,and customers. The distributing utilities arc no longer dealing with a single power
supplier and they are no longer the only supplier for their customers. It is also
among the objectives of the regulatou, authorities to prevent vertically integrated
companies from cross-subsidisation by transferring resources from monopoly to
competitive activities.
(b) Environmental regulations:
Such regulations have either been introduced by public law or are the result of
negotiations between the Danish Government and the two regional associations; or
a combination of both. Examples of negotiated regulations are: the obligation of
the two regional associations to construct a certain ,’maount of wind turbines and
small local CHP-plant; and the obligation to use straw and gas as a fuel in some of
the central power plants. Examples of a combined solution are the quotas for SOz-
and NOx-emissions the implementation of which is administered by the industr3,.
Under the conditions of an open market, the power generators cannot be
expected to accept obligations that are not extended to their competitors and
thereby will harm their position. Environmental rcgulatioas must be implemented
as: comnlon obligations for all power suppliers (e.g., to use certain fuels or to keep
emissions within specified limits); direct subsidies (to the favoured fltels and
power producing technologies); or as obligatioas for the transmission and
distributing utilities (to give dispatch priority to the favoured alternatives).
It should be added that certain policy instnmlents such as duties and tradable
permits are well suited to work with competition. Preferably, they should be
introduced on a super-national level to cover the whole market for power.
5. 6. Conclusion
The Nordic countries are very electricity intensive and their prices are lower
than in other European countries. Nordic co-operation has allowed beneficial
exchanges of power among different technologies.
Three Nordic countries are now introducing major reforms of their electricity
supply industr3,. With the exception of privatisation, these changes are as radical
as those included in the UK reform from 1990. They will create access for all
groups of customers to competing suppliers.
Norway was first to reform its electricity industry and has already gained
experience that can be useful for other countries. However, the Norwegian power
supply is unique because of its exclusive use of hydro-power and because of the
large number of producers. The other Nordic countries (and other European
countries as well) will start with a much higher degree of concentration of their
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power supply. Increased Nordic co-operation is an obvious measure if one wishes
to avoid monopolistic dominance of domestic markets.
Denmark is different. It is much less electrici~, intensive than the three other
Nordic countries and has (partly) a different organisational tradition. The country
is, however, an active participant in the Nordic co-operation from which it has
received considerable benefit.
The international trend favouring competition in electricity supply has been
met with reluctance by the industry and by the political authorities. In the paper, I
argue that this attitude is not justified by poor economic performance. The Danish
electricity production, that is becoming more and more dominated by combined
heat and power (CHP), should be competitive on a Northern European market for
power. Such a market will also open new possibilities for the CHP-generators for
beneficial exchanges.
These conclusions, however, presuppose major changes of the present Danish
regulatory system that relies on agreements between industry and authorities. Such
relationships must be replaced by more arm’s length arrangements. This applies to
both monopoly and environmental regulations.
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